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Abstract: Ramsey famously pronounced that discounting “future enjoy-
ments” would be ethically indefensible. Suppes enunciated an equity cri-
terion implying that all individuals’ welfare should be treated equally. By
contrast, Arrow (1999a, b) accepted, perhaps rather reluctantly, the logical
force of Koopmans’ argument that no satisfactory preference ordering on
a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility streams satisfies equal
treatment. In this paper, we first derive an equitable utilitarian objective
based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, extended to
allow a variable and uncertain population with no finite bound. Following
the work of Chichilnisky and others on sustainability, slightly weakening the
conditions of Koopmans and co-authors allows intergenerational equity to
be satisfied. In fact, assuming that the expected total number of individ-
uals who ever live is finite, and that each individual’s utility is bounded
both above and below, there is a coherent equitable objective based on ex-
pected total utility. Moreover, it implies the “extinction discounting rule”
advocated by, inter alia, the Stern Review on climate change.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Kenneth Arrow on Discounting the Future
On February 23rd 2017 the world lost Kenneth Arrow (KJA), the father
of social choice and a towering giant among economists. He was greatly
admired by all three authors of this paper.1
During his seventies KJA had given two closely related lectures, first
to the 1995 World Congress of the International Economic Association, and
second to a 1996 conference on discounting that was organized jointly by the
(Stanford) Energy Modeling Forum and by Resources for the Future. These
lectures, later published in Arrow (1999a, b), both considered the question
we address in this paper: at what rate should we discount the welfare of
future generations? Indeed, should the discount rate even be zero?
In these two lectures, KJA highlighted two arguments in favour of dis-
counting future generations:2
1. a strong argument, claiming that failing to discount future generations
would lead to a logical inconsistency;
2. a weak argument, claiming that failing to discount future generations
would imply a savings rate that imposed excessive sacrifices on the
current generation.
Our main concern in this paper is whether, in a suitably extended util-
itarian social choice theory, the strong argument can be obviated by recog-
nizing that there is a stochastic process, perhaps partly subject to human
influence, which determines when humanity will eventually become extinct.
In fact we specify two assumptions ensuring that maximizing the expected
value of the unweighted total utility of all future generations is logically
coherent as a social welfare objective. These assumptions are:
1Gaertner (2017), a founding editor of Social Choice and Welfare, contributed a short
obituary to these pages. It was preceded by a photograph that one of us (PJH) had taken
more than 10 years earlier of KJA standing outside the Landau Economics Building at
Stanford. It portrayed him holding a representation in metal of an Edgeworth box with
an apple core inside, bearing the label “The Core of the Arrow–Debreu Economy”. This
is a sports trophy awarded each year to the winners of the “little big game” of (American)
touch football that is played between the Ph.D. students of the Departments of Economics
at Berkeley and Stanford.
2KJA attributed both these arguments to Koopmans. Yet later, in Section 2.5, we
will give reasons for believing that Koopmans, as well as his co-author Diamond, thought
that these arguments should be applied only to the intertemporal preferences of a single
consumer, rather than to those of an “ethical benefactor” who is choosing policy on behalf
of society as a whole.
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1. the expected total population of all individuals who live at any time
before the uncertain extinction date is finite;
2. and, following an assumption made famous by Arrow (1951, 1965,
1971, 1972), the common fundamental utility function of each potential
individual is bounded both above and below.
With these assumptions, maximizing expected total utility involves the ex-
tinction discounting rule whereby successive future generations are weighted
by their declining probability of existence. Under this rule, which is advo-
cated inter alia in the Stern Review (Stern, 2006), all individuals are treated
equally, contingent on their existence, as intergenerational equity would seem
to require. In fact, future generations should be given increasing weight, in
proportion to their growing size, as long as expected population, allowing
for the probability of extinction, continues to expand.
Finally, we consider a refinement of the extinction discounting rule which
meets Chichilnisky’s (1996, 1997, 2009) definition of “sustainable prefer-
ences”.
1.2 Background
Despite the arguments set out in Arrow (1999a, b), as well as the discussion
in Arrow (2007) of the Stern Review (Stern, 2006), it seems that KJA’s views
on discounting the welfare of future generations may have been evolving.
During the late 1960s, he had begun working on the problem of specifying
an appropriate discount rate in social cost–benefit analysis. This led to the
eventual publication of Arrow (1966, 1982), as well as of Arrow and Kurz
(1970) and Arrow and Lind (1970).3
Some decades later, while director of the Stanford Institute of Theoret-
ical Economics (SITE), he organized in 1993 a summer workshop session
on the topic “Reconsideration of Values”.4 It included GC’s invited talk,
which PJH attended, with an early version of ideas that later appeared in
3NHS recalls that he first met KJA in Oxford in 1969, on a visit organized by Mirrlees.
This was around the time when Little and Mirrlees (1969) was published. There was an
intense discussion of values, intertemporal and otherwise, in the context of social cost–
benefit analysis. KJA was, as ever, in the vanguard.
4PJH recalls that in 1988, as KJA was nearing what at the time was the compulsory
retirement age of 70, while John Shoven was chair of the Stanford Department of Eco-
nomics, both Donald Brown and Paul Milgrom were recruited. Also IMSSS (the Institute
of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences), which Mordecai Kurz had directed very
successfully for 20 years, was replaced by SITE, with Milgrom as its founding director.
SITE remains very active 30 years later.
2
Chichilnisky (1996, 1997).5 Rather than follow earlier work described in the
early part of Section 7 which had considered whether infinite-horizon plans
are sustainable, she instead characterized “sustainable preferences”. These
were the welfare criteria defined in Section 7 which avoid dictatorship of
either the present or the future, and whose maximization would normally
lead to some form of sustainable development path.
1.3 An Unfulfilled Plan
On PJH’s frequent return visits to Stanford, during several discussions over
lunch, KJA put forward two reasons to discount the welfare of future gener-
ations. Essentially these correspond to two arguments that KJA attributed
to Koopmans, as discussed further in Section 2.6
Indeed, following one of these lunches, KJA seemed ready to go along
with a suggested plan for PJH to write up, as the genesis of a joint paper,
an argument for what we call here “extinction discounting”, as discussed in
Section 1.1. On the basis of arguments from social choice theory, this is the
rule which we advocate in this paper, subject to a possible caveat regarding
GC’s concept of “dictatorship of the present”, as discussed in Section 8.7.
The intention had been that, in a fuller version of this projected joint
work, eventually KJA would respond with any objections he might have
to the extinction discounting rule. Perhaps KJA would also have taken
up his side of some earlier friendly debates with NHS, while also engaging
with GC’s work on issues surrounding sustainable preferences that KJA
had cited. It was also planned that this two-author paper would become a
tribute, perhaps even in these pages, to our mutual friend Patrick Suppes,
the great scientific philosopher, who had died on November 17th, 2014.7
Indeed, the equity principle due to Suppes plays a key role in our argument.
Unfortunately PJH’s other commitments prevented this plan from being
taken even as far as a first draft. What can never be determined, therefore,
is whether KJA’s conversations with PJH just possibly might have been a
5See also the first footnote of Chichilnisky (1996). A preprint version of Chichilnisky
(1997) was cited in Arrow, Cline et al. (1996).
6During these discussions PJH remained unaware of Arrow (1999a, 1999b), whose
existence KJA did not deign to mention. But it was clear that KJA had been inspired by
his late friend Tjalling Koopmans, who had been a mentor during his time at the Cowles
Foundation when it was still in Chicago. It is also said that Koopmans had persuaded
KJA and Ge´rard Debreu to amalgamate their separate working papers into what became
Arrow and Debreu’s (1954) classic paper on existence of general competitive equilibrium.
7We should mention that, in addition to KJA, Suppes had also been an advisory editor
of Social Choice and Welfare.
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typical sign that he recognizing the importance of revisiting the topic of
discounting in order to make sure that both the ethical and mathemati-
cal analysis were done right. Indeed, by combining a simplistic misuse of
the strong argument regarding logical necessity with claims that market in-
terest rates carry relevant information, many writers had tried to justify
excessively high rates of pure-time discounting. Our paper deals directly
with the strong argument. As for market interest rates, they do not clearly
reflect social preferences, especially as most financial markets suffer from
important market failures.8
1.4 Outline of Paper
Section 2 sets out in some detail Arrow’s (1999a, b) discussion of the two
arguments in favour of discounting the welfare of future generations that he
attributed to Koopmans. Of these, the one that deserves more attention
from social choice theorists is the first “strong” argument claiming that
discounting is logically necessary. It will therefore be the main subject of
this paper. Limitations of space and time compel us to offer no more than
a few remarks in Section 2.6 regarding the second “weak” argument stating
that failure to discount asks the current generation to sacrifice too much.
See, however, Stern (2006, 2008, 2015) for extensive further discussion.
Next, Section 3 begins to lay out the basic normative framework that
we use to analyse the ethical decisions involved in choosing between alter-
native futures for humanity. We emphasize that our approach is thoroughly
normative, and so departs from any descriptive framework that involves con-
cepts such as Hume’s (1739) distinction between higher and lower selves, or
Kahneman’s (2011) distinction between fast and slow thinking. Hume in
particular, and probably Kahneman as well, saw the importance of basing
policy recommendations on social values. We have in mind a concept of ra-
tionality closely related to the kind of thoughtful behaviour discussed in the
early pages of Savage (1954), after he realized that he had at first reported
irrational preferences in the context of the Allais paradox.
Also, like most work in social choice and welfare, our approach is thor-
oughly consequentialist, for reasons that we try to explain in Section 3.2.
Nevertheless, Section 9.2 offers some discussion of alternative ethical ap-
proaches, as well as the conclusion reached in Stern (2014a, 2015) that these
approaches also do not justify the bias toward the present that discounting
the welfare of future generations would imply.
8See Hammond (1992) for one possible explanation of these failures, based on a com-
bination of moral hazard and adverse selection in loan markets.
4
Reverting to social choice theory, we note that Arrow (1950) and many
subsequent works followed the tradition pioneered by Borda and Condorcet,
which based social preferences entirely on individual preferences. To avoid
the logical difficulties that this approach created, Sen (1970) pioneered the
use of richer information in the form of interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Yet, as discussed in Hammond (1996b), there was no clear explanation of
how these comparisons should be made.
Here, by contrast, as befits an analysis of how (and whether) to dis-
count the welfare of future generations, we revisit and elaborate some of the
ideas concerning “interpersonally comparable utility” that were set out first
in Hammond (1991) and then more systematically in Fleurbaey and Ham-
mond (2004). Section 3 explains how, when the welfare of each individual
depends upon their own all-inclusive personal lifetime consequence y ∈ Y ,
one can derive a single cardinal equivalence class of interpersonally compa-
rable fundamental utility functions Y 3 y 7→ u(y) ∈ R. These are defined
on the universal domain Y , with expectations that apply to the set ∆(Y )
of all possible lotteries over that domain. Indeed, when choosing between
members of a family of biased versions of the “Vickrey–Harsanyi original
position”, it is ethically appropriate to maximize the expectation of u.
Starting with this basic framework for our version of utilitarian social
choice theory, Section 4 presents a version of Suppes’ equity criterion. This
implies that, given a fixed population, it is appropriate to consider an unbi-
ased Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, where there is an equal probability
of becoming any one of the individuals in society.
Thereafter, Section 5 argues that when the population is not fixed, it is
appropriate to maximize the expected total welfare of all individuals who
ever exist in the future. Unlike maximizing their expected average welfare,
this is linked to the idea that, in a relevant initial position where even each
individual’s eventual existence is treated as risky, an increased population
implies a higher probability of coming into existence.
Given this measure of welfare for each potential individual in society, it
remains to determine what intergenerational objective is ethically appropri-
ate for the actual social decisions that we will be forced to make. We note
that these decisions must allow for the problem of climate change, includ-
ing worries about the Storms of My Grandchildren that James Hansen has
written about. This task is made much more complicated to the extent that
the strong argument in favour of discounting the lives of future generations
is valid.
Now, an Arrow social welfare function is a mapping from a domain of
individual preference profiles into a social preference ordering. A key pos-
5
tulate used in Arrow’s impossibility theorem is that the social welfare func-
tion has an unrestricted domain of all logically possible preference profiles.
A well-known escape from this theorem involves restricting the domain of
the Arrow social welfare function. Specifically, under the assumption that
there is an odd finite number of individuals, if the domain of preference
profiles is restricted to those that are single-peaked relative to a given linear
ordering of the social states, then the Condorcet majority rule is a social
welfare function that satisfies all four of Arrow’s conditions. In the same
way, Sections 6 and 7 together explore various restrictions on the domain of
infinite horizon decision trees. Indeed, when the welfare measure for each
generation is its total level of welfare, even discounting future generations’
welfare only works if population growth is slow enough for the discounted
total population to be finite.
We are especially interested, however, in attempts to escape what Chi-
chilnisky (1996, 1997, 2009b) has called “dictatorship of the present”, which
is defined in Section 7.5. These attempts include: a Ramsey rule without
discounting on a restricted domain; maximin on a restricted domain; various
extensions of maximin due to Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2012), and
Asheim and Zuber (2013); and the general family of “sustainable” prefer-
ences advocated by Chichilnisky (1996, 1997, 2009b) and Heal (1998).
Next, in Section 8, we look for circumstances in which after all one
can justify, if not full intergenerational equity without discounting, then at
least the “extinction discounting” rule that, after receiving early attention
in Ramsey (1928) and Mirrlees (1967), is favoured in the Stern Review —
see Stern (2006, 2015) and, among many critical assessments, Arrow (2007)
and Dasgupta (2007, 2008). In our framework, which combines a stochastic
extinction process with personal consequence streams for infinitely many
potential future individuals, the key domain restriction is to require that
the expected population, before ultimate extinction, is finite.
The important assumption of a finite expected population prevents the
infinite tail of future generations from wagging the dog of current policy
formation. It is obviously satisfied under the plausible hypothesis that to-
tal world population eventually stabilizes, provided that there is a positive
probability of extinction at dates far enough into the future, even if that
probability is arbitrarily small. Indeed, what our domain restriction requires
is that the increasing probability of extinction should outweigh population
growth. So, provided that the probability of extinction approaches 1 fast
enough, this assumption does not exclude exponential population growth of
the kind that one finds in some versions of the standard economic growth
model due to Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) — growth which Ehrlich (1968)
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described as a “population bomb”.
Section 9 sets out some tentative conclusions. In particular, we speculate
whether KJA’s eagerness to revisit the discounting issue may have reflected
some doubt about what he had written in Arrow (1999a, b). We also briefly
discuss discounting in the light of ethical doctrines other than utilitarianism.
Finally, we offer some thoughts about how technical progress, including the
kind of learning by doing that Arrow (1962) had popularized, might affect
the “weak argument” that failure to discount future generations’ welfare —
or failure to discount it at rates higher than those implied by extinction
discounting — might place an excessive burden on current generations.
2 Two Arguments for Discounting
2.1 The Social Rate of Discount
Following what has become standard practice since at least Arrow and Kurz
(1970), Section 3 of Arrow (1999a) gives the formula r = ρ+θg for the social
rate of discount, where9
ρ is the rate of pure time preference (if any), θ is the elasticity
of marginal utility with respect to income, and g is the rate of
growth of consumption per capita . . . ρ = 0 implies equal treat-
ment of present and future.
Then Section 4 of Arrow (1999a) starts as follows:
In [the] formula [r = ρ + θg], the second term, θg, is, I think,
fairly uncontroversial. If future individuals are going to be better
off than we are, then our willingness to sacrifice on their behalf
is certainly reduced. It would require a greater rate of return to
justify our depriving ourselves of consumption.
But the presence of pure time preference, denoted by ρ, has been
very controversial. The English economists, in particular, have
tended to be very scornful of pure time preference.
2.2 Discounting Future Consumption
In the ensuing discussion of the term θg, Arrow (1999a) considers how to
value an increment in a good in the future, relative to an increment now.
9See also Stern (1977).
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This is the discount factor, which we denote by β, for that good at that
time. The proportionate rate of fall of the discount factor, given by −β˙/β =
− ddt lnβ, is the discount rate for that good at that time; it clearly depends on
both the good and the time. In our view, the focus in economic assessments
should be on the discount factor, as that is the key shadow price, relative
to now, which is needed to find the marginal present value of any change in
costs or benefits occurring at any specific time in the future. When we need
to evaluate a stream of costs and benefits over time, we can consider the net
present value (NPV) of the whole stream, with the costs and benefits at each
time t weighted by the discount factor β(t). That is, at time 0 one considers
NPV :=
∫ T
0 β(t)b(t) dt, where b(t) denotes net benefit at time t, and T
denotes the terminal time. When allowing for the inevitable uncertainty
surrounding future costs and benefits, one approach is to consider their
expected discounted value.
Once we have the right concept of the discount factor that should be ap-
plied to future consumption, it becomes immediately clear that this factor
will depend on the state of affairs at each relevant time in the future. Un-
managed climate change could make future generations very poor. Then we
might place a very high value on extra goods that are available in calamitous
circumstances. This could even imply negative a discount rate, or equiva-
lently, a discount factor greater than one. This possibility also makes it clear
that each uncertain future state of the world that could occur is of critical
relevance. So, too, is the person or persons who may experience increments
in income. Indeed, using the term “the discount rate”, as if there is just
one given rate, clearly constitutes a serious misunderstanding of the basic
issues.
So the relevant discount rates in any calculation of expected discounted
value are endogenously determined as a result of our planned decisions.
Moreover, this endogeneity is potentially severe in the case of climate change.
We conclude that, unlike examples like border prices when considering poli-
cies in what international economics regards as a small national economy,
one cannot simply import an exogenous discount rate from outside the
model.
2.3 Discounting Other Generations’ Future Lives
Our concern in this paper, however, is much more with the ρ term of the
formula r = ρ + θg that Arrow (1999a) gives for the discount rate. This is
often called pure time discounting, or pure time preference. It arises when
we contemplate policies whose effects, like the climate change induced by
8
greenhouse gas emissions, extend far into the future. This should force us to
give some value to the consumption of people who live in the future. Pure
time discounting involves, and is even essentially defined as, the relative
weight attached to a life in the future compared to a life now, when the two
lives are otherwise identical in all respects. That is, the only difference is
that one life is in the future, whereas the other is right now.
If the pure time discount rate were 2% per annum, for example, then a
life starting 35 years in the future that is otherwise identical to a life that
starts now, would have a relative value of 1.02−35 ≈ 0.5 compared to a life
that starts now. In this sense we are “discounting future lives”, which is
effectively discriminating by date of birth. It cannot be justified by some
notion of the future life being better because it has higher consumption;
that would be discounting future consumption, as considered in Section 2.2,
as opposed to discounting future welfare per se. We emphasize that we are
making an ethical comparison between two lives that are identical, except
for the dates of birth. It is very difficult to find serious ethical arguments
for the kind of discrimination that is involved in giving less weight to future
generations’ well-being. Indeed, Hara et al. (2008) remind us of a highly
relevant passage from Sidgwick (1907, p. 414):
“How far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they
seem to conflict with those of existing human beings? It seems,
however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect
the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and
that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much
as those of his contemporaries, . . . .”
In his celebrated paper on optimal saving, Ramsey (1928, p. 261) famously
started out by following the spirit of Sidgwick when he refused to discount
the welfare of future generations:
One point should perhaps be emphasised more particularly; it is
assumed that we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison
with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and
arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.10
Arrow (1999b) not only quotes this passage from Ramsey, but also adds
two later quotes from other English economists. The first is from Pigou
(1932, p. 25) stating that pure time preference “implies . . . our telescopic
10The latter part of the paper “no longer reckon[s] future utilities and disutilities as
equal to present ones, but discount[s] them at a constant rate ρ.” (Ramsey, 1928, p. 553).
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faculty is defective.” The second is Harrod’s (1948, p. 40) claim that “[P]ure
time preference [is] a polite expression for rapacity and the conquest of
reason by passion.”11
2.4 Discounting Our Own Future
When individuals contemplate their own future consumption, a discussion
of how to discount it very like that in Section 2.2 might easily arise. On the
other hand, if the same individuals contemplate their own future standard
of living, there may be a closer parallel with Section 2.3. For example,
an individual saving for retirement might want to discount future income
somewhat if there is no longer any need to cover the expense of travelling
to work, or of being able to live very close to work.
Such discounting of our own futures is quite different from what con-
cerns us here. We are examining the ethical issue of whether there is any
justification for discounting a life simply and only on the grounds that it
starts later. It is not clear why the impatience of an individual who may
value the future less than the present should be at all relevant to ethics.
The fact some people are sometimes impatient in their own decisions does
not tell us that there is any moral justification for discriminating between
different people just because some are born decades later than others.
At this point it may be worth reminding the reader that market prices
and interest rates, or rates of return, are very unlikely to give us ethical eval-
uations of the kind needed to guide society toward good decisions. Instead,
they describe facts concerning the outcomes (equilibrium or otherwise) of
the individual choices of many market participants. Indeed, market interest
rates typically do not even give ethically appropriate individual marginal
valuations, especially given the many interrelated imperfections that seem
inevitable in capital markets — see, for example, Hammond (1992). Looking
at market rates is rarely an ethically defensible route to the social evalua-
tions that are necessary here.
We do mention, however, that just as mortality is one reason for dis-
counting our own futures, so the possibility of human extinction is a reason
for discounting social outcomes, as discussed in Section 8.
11Among other works dicussing intergenerational equity we mention Arrow et al. (1997)
as well as Svensson (1980), Brown and Lewis (1981), Lauwers (1993, 1997a, b, c, 2010,
2017), Broome (1994), Atkinson (2001), Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), Basu and Mitra
(2003, 2007a, b), Ponthie`re (2003), Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007), Mitra and
Basu (2007), Zame (2007), Hara et al. (2008), Creedy and Guest (2008), Asheim (2010),
Bossert and Suzumura (2011), Roemer (2011), Mertens and Rubinchik (2012), Quiggin
(2012), Dubey and Mitra (2013).
10
2.5 The Strong Argument
The first reason that KJA gave for discounting, impatience, or time perspec-
tive was what we will call the “strong argument”. This is to be distinguished
from what Arrow (1999b) explicitly describes as the “weak Koopmans ar-
gument”, which receives brief attention in Section 2.6 below.
To quote Arrow (1999b):12
Why then not embrace the idea of zero time perspective? Koop-
mans in several classic papers (1960, 1964) gave a crushing an-
swer; see also Brown and Lewis (1981) for a more general treat-
ment. The argument seems recondite. Koopmans considers a
world which lasts forever. Therefore choice (including ethically-
based choice) is based on a preference ordering over infinite-
dimensional consumption streams. He argues that if the order-
ing is continuous and also sensitive (i.e., if one stream is never
worse than another and is better at one or more time points,
then it must be strictly preferred), it must display impatience.
A simple restatement of his reasoning can bring out the essential
point. I confine myself to the intertemporally separable case.
Imagine initially that output consists of a constant stream of
completely perishable goods. There can be no investment by
definition. Now imagine that an investment opportunity occurs,
available only to the first generation. For each unit sacrificed
by them, a perpetual stream of α per unit time is generated.
If there were no time preference, . . . we can say that given any
investment, short of the entire income, a still greater investment
would be preferred.
Thus, Arrow concludes that without impatience the optimal saving rate
could become arbitrarily close to 100%. A similar conclusion emerges from
the cake-eating example described by Gale (1967, p. 4, Example 2).
Nevertheless, the following passage from Koopmans (1960, pp. 287–288)
suggests that he at least intended his results to be applied only in the rather
different context of consumer choice:
This study started out as an attempt to formulate postulates per-
mitting a sharp definition of impatience, the short term Irving
Fisher has introduced for preference for advanced timing of sat-
isfaction. To avoid complications connected with the advancing
12The opening question in the quotation is a valuable addition in Arrow (1999b) to the
corresponding passage in Arrow (1999a).
11
age and finite life span of the individual consumer, these pos-
tulates were set up for a (continuous) utility function of a con-
sumption program extending over an infinite future period. The
surprising result was that only a slight strengthening of the con-
tinuity postulate . . . permits one to conclude from the existence
of a utility function satisfying the postulates, that impatience
prevails at least in certain areas of the program space.
Thus, it seems that Koopmans (and Diamond) started out by consid-
ering only consumers who discount their own future selves, as discussed in
Section 2.4.13 Nevertheless, it was natural for Arrow to consider the ob-
vious extension to social choice theory, with an infinite series of successive
generations. Indeed, this follows the tradition of the later works by Koop-
mans (1965, 1967), who even devotes part of these surveys to the Ramsey
case when the welfare of future generations remains undiscounted. Then
the same mathematical analysis which, under some conditions, shows that
a consumer cannot treat equally consumption in an infinite number of peri-
ods, also rules out intergenerational equity, in the sense of treating all future
generations equally.
2.6 The Weak Argument
Arrow (1999a) offered an additional reason for abandoning intergenerational
equity:
I therefore conclude that the strong ethical requirement that
all generations be treated alike, itself reasonable, contradicts a
very strong intuition that it is not morally acceptable to demand
excessively high savings rates of any one generation, or even of
every generation.
A very similar argument is adduced in Arrow (1999b), where he adds:
Not merely is saving arbitrarily close to 100% unacceptable but
very high sacrifices are also. I call this the weak Koopmans ar-
gument.
13Stern (2014b, p. 472; 2015, p. 169) also quotes a recent personal communication in
which Peter Diamond, a co-author of Koopmans et al. (1964), had argued to the effect
that the results of this line of work, if they would indeed preclude intergenerational equity,
should not be applied to the issue of whether to discount the welfare of future generations.
Instead Diamond has argued in favour of the kind of “pragmatic” criteria that we discuss
near the end of Section 6.7.
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And in Arrow (2007, p. 4) he writes:
Tjalling Koopmans pointed out in effect that the savings rates
implied by zero time preference are very much higher than those
we observe. (I am myself convinced by this argument.)
The later joint paper by Arrow et al. (2013) even advocates a declining
discount factor, though this may be justified if it is applied to monetary
measures of consumer benefit when these are increasing over time.
Moreover, the concluding parts of Arrow (1999a, b) move toward con-
sidering the kind of growth framework with equilibrium in a dynamic game,
as propounded by the foundational work of Phelps and Pollak (1968), which
Arrow cites, as well as by Inagaki (1970, 1973), Dasgupta (1974, 1994),
and others. Of course, the sophisticated — or what we would now call the
“subgame perfect” equilibrium — outcome of such a game typically involves
later plans that deviate from earlier intentions, as discussed in Hammond
(1976b) and many subsequent writings.
This weak argument was discussed in Stern (2006, 2008, 2015) — see
especially Stern (2008, p. 16). In his comment on the Stern Report, however,
Arrow (2007, p. 4) himself suggests that, at least in the context of mitigating
climate change, the discounting issue may lack practical importance:
Many have complained about the Stern Review adopting a value
of zero for ρ, the social rate of time preference. However, I find
that the case for intervention to keep CO2 levels within bounds
(say, aiming to stabilize them at about 550 ppm) is sufficiently
strong as to be insensitive to the arguments about ρ.14
Thus, KJA’s reasoning included the recognition that, even with substantial
pure-time discounting, unmanaged climate change has the potential to cause
damage severe enough to justify strong action.
We would agree, while noting that Stern (2015) in particular discusses
how many current economic models fail to capture adequately the immense
potential damage. We also note this observation from Stern (2008, p. 19):
. . . for any given set of structural risks and a utility function, pure
time discounting . . . can be set so that the estimated damages are
as small as we please.
14Since KJA wrote this, the scientific consensus on the potential damage due to climate
change has become increasingly worrying. So the 550 ppm concentration level that KJA
suggests should now be seen as too high. In the light of Stern (2008, p. 5), for example,
that level seems incompatible with the Paris COP 21 aspiration that global warming since
the pre-industrial era should not exceed 2◦ C. — or ideally, 1.5◦ C. Presumably this
revision strengthens KJA’s argument.
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Actually the extraordinary technical progress in low and even negative car-
bon technologies since 2007, when KJA made that remark, suggest that his
conclusion would be even more robust now.
3 Basic Framework: Consequences and Utilities
3.1 Consequentialist Rationality in Ethical Decision-Making
Following the early work of Keynes, Ramsey and de Finetti on subjective
probability, Savage (1954) set out a path-breaking theory of rational choice.
This was based on defining an act as a mapping from uncertain states of the
world to consequences. Earlier Arrow (1951, p. 404), in his article on “choice
in risk-taking situations”, had summed up a key argument as follows:
Among the actions actually available, then, that action is chosen
whose consequences are preferred to those of any other available
action.
Later, in the concluding part of Arrow (1963) — the definitive second
edition of his Ph.D. dissertation that included several significant revisions
— KJA addressed the question of why society should maximize a (complete
and transitive) preference ordering. This inspired PJH to embark on a line
of research that, among other things, derived the existence of a complete
and transitive preference ordering from three “consequentialist hypotheses”.
These require that behaviour should not only be well-defined and dynami-
cally consistent on an unrestricted domain of finite decision trees, but that
its consequences should be explicable as the result of planned choices.15
Meanwhile PJH learned that “consequentialism” was a neologism that
Anscombe (1958) had applied to an ethical doctrine she wanted to criticize.
Indeed, to quote the entry on Anscombe in the online Stanford Encylope-
dia of Philosophy, this article of hers “stimulated the development of virtue
ethics as an alternative to Utilitarianism, Kantian Ethics, and Social Con-
tract theories.” Yet, as is characteristic of his broad scholarship, KJA had
earlier introduced PJH to St. Thomas Aquinas’s much more authoritative
rejection of consequentialism:
15Relevant writings include Hammond (1986) in the Arrow Festschrift, as well as Ham-
mond (1996a), which was an invited contribution to a conference that KJA co-organized
during his presidency of the International Economic Association.
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On the Contrary, The consequences do not make an action evil
that was good; nor good one that was evil.16
Anscombe’s critique of consequentialism appears to arise from a notion
of “consequence” that was too limited to include the kind of virtues that she
regarded as important. The modern school of virtue ethics that she inspired
harks back to concepts from the ancient Greeks such as eudaimonia, often
translated as “human flourishing”. Though even here, Anscombe (1958, p.
15) issues the following warning
. . . philosophically there is a huge gap, at present unfillable as far
as we are concerned, which needs to be filled by an account of
human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue
is, and above all of human “flourishing”. And it is the last
concept that appears the most doubtful.
3.2 Consequentialization
Despite Anscombe’s work, it is clear that in principle consequences should
be defined sufficiently broadly to include everything, even eudaimonia, that
philosophers can legitimately claim to be ethically relevant. Other rele-
vant parts of any consequence could include considerations that would lead
Aquinas to judge the goodness or evil of an act, as well as issues of concern
to the “impartial spectator” who plays such a key role in Adam Smith’s
Theory of Moral Sentiments.17
Indeed, the possibility of this process of “consequentialization” has been
explored by several philosophers, including Portmore (2007, 2009), Brown
(2011), and Mukerji (2016). One must admit, however, that as the concept
of bounded rationality recognizes, fruitful analysis of any practical ethical
decision problem will most likely require a considerably less unwieldy con-
cept of consequence. Yet in the end any coherent consequentialist theory of
16From Summa Theologiae, First Part of the Second Part, Question 20, Article 5, Ob-
jection. The Latin original is “Sed contra, eventus sequens non facit actum malum qui
erat bonus, nec bonum qui erat malus.” KJA recalled a version due to Dorothy Sayers in
the commentary to her English translation of Dante Alighieri’s Divina Commedia.
17This paragraph is inspired in part by the issues that Patrick Suppes kindly raised
when discussing Hammond (1988) at the May 1986 conference on “Distributive Justice
and Inequality” at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. At the time, the most meaningful
part of PJH’s inadequate response may have been the remark that philosophers like Pat
excel at drawing attention to the ethical relevance of consequences that belong to domains
much richer than those usually considered by economists.
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ethical decision making, even one that allows for bounded rationality, pre-
sumably must be based on a suitably specified consequence domain, even if
that domain must be modelled incompletely.
3.3 A Universal Domain of Personal Consequences
Our interest is in applying prescriptive social choice theory to an issue that
arises in welfare economics — namely, specifying what discount rates one
should apply to future generations’ welfare. For this one uses an individu-
alistic theory of social consequences that starts with a “universal” personal
consequence domain, which we take to be a non-empty set Y whose typi-
cal member y has many attributes or dimensions. Following the discussion
of Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we postulate that each y ∈ Y is “all-inclusive” in
the sense that includes everything that is ethically relevant to any decision,
whether individual or social, that concerns a person’s life history. These di-
mensions should include the individual’s own preferences and beliefs, insofar
as they are deemed relevant. They should also allow for variations in the
date and circumstances surrounding an individual’s birth, upbringing, and
death, including those aspects that also affect parents, partners and fam-
ily members. Thus, with one exception, we assume that each consequence
y ∈ Y has attributes which include personal copies of any ethically relevant
common or impersonal circumstances that are shared with other persons.
The one exception, which we use repeatedly from Section 5 on when
discussing demographic consequences, is that we postulate one particular
non-existence consequence y0 ∈ Y . This is the unique personal consequence
that comes about if and only if the person concerned never exists.
3.4 Social Consequences as Personal Consequence Profiles
Initially, we consider a finite fixed potential population of size n ∈ N. Thus,
the set of numerical labels is taken to be
Nn := {1, 2, . . . , n} = {i ∈ N | i ≤ n} (1)
Later, starting in Section 6, we will extend our analysis to potentially
infinite populations. This is of course the case that was of most concern to
Ramsey and Arrow. For now, however, with population fixed at size n, we
take the social consequence domain to be the n-fold Cartesian product Y n
of the personal consequence domain Y . So each social consequence yn ∈ Y n
is an n-dimensional profile
yn = 〈yi〉ni=1 = 〈yi〉i∈Nn (2)
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of personal consequences for the n individuals who are given numbers in the
set Nn ⊂ N defined by (1).
3.5 Biased and Extended Original Positions
Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977, 1978, 1979) indepen-
dently formulated the idea that ethical social decisions would be those that
were taken impartially in a version of what Rawls (1971) later described as
an “original position”, behind a “veil of ignorance” where the decision-maker
does not know which person she or he will become eventually. Of course,
Rawls famously suggested that such decisions should satisfy his “difference
principle”, which requires that any differences in individuals’ allocations of
“primary goods” had to be justified because they would make all individ-
uals better off. This gave rise to the “Rawlsian maximin” rule that would
maximize the minimum level of well-being. It was a principle that Harsanyi
(1975) in particular criticized. By contrast, what we will call the Vickrey–
Harsanyi original position requires the impartial ethical decision-making
agency to contemplate what it would choose in case it faced an even chance
lottery whose different outcomes were the personal consequences of the var-
ious individuals in society — see also the discussion by Mongin (2001) and
others of Harsanyi’s “impartial observer”.
The theory presented here will also accommodate lotteries in the form of
biased original positions where, upon emerging from behind the probabilistic
version of the veil of ignorance, there are arbitrary specified probabilities µi
of becoming different people i ∈ Nn. Indeed, we consider extended original
positions where these biased probabilities of becoming different people can
even be chosen.
To include these extended original position lotteries, we start with a
general domain of ordinary finite decision trees in which the consequence
attached to each terminal node is a lottery λ ∈ ∆(Y n) over the domain
Y n of social consequences. To include any biased original position, we re-
place each such terminal node where the consequence lottery is λ ∈ ∆(Y n)
with some “original position” chance node. At any such node, there is a
specified probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(Nn) that gives the probability µi
of becoming each individual numbered i ∈ Nn. Thereafter, person i expe-
riences the relevant marginal consequence lottery margi λ over i’s personal
copy of the domain Y of extended personal consequences. Given λ ∈ ∆(Y n),
this marginal lottery has probabilities given by
λi(y) := margi λ(y) := λ({yn ∈ Y n | yi = y}) (3)
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3.6 Fundamental Cardinal Utility
We follow the standard economist’s view that ethical theory should pre-
scribe normatively appropriate decisions for society. Specifically, following
Hammond (1996a, 1998), we impose rationality and continuity postulates
requiring that prescribed social behaviour should:
1. be well-defined over the domain of decision nodes in all finite decision
trees with consequences in the domain ∆(Y n) of lotteries over social
consequences, excluding only decision trees in which one or more zero
probabilities are attached at chance nodes of the tree;
2. determine consequences that are explicable as the planned choice of
ethically desirable lotteries over social consequences;
3. satisfy “dynamic consistency” in the sense that behaviour prescribed
at a decision node in any continuation subtree should match what had
been prescribed earlier for that node;
4. vary continuously w.r.t. the non-zero probabilities at any chance node
of a tree.
As explained in many works, these four postulates together imply the ex-
istence of a cardinal equivalence class of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
functions Y 3 y 7→ u(y) ∈ R with the property that the consequences of pre-
scribed behaviour in any finite decision tree should be a consequence lottery
λ ∈ ∆(Y ) that maximizes lifetime expected utility
Eλu =
∑
y∈Y λ(y)u(y) (4)
over the finite set of lifetime consequence lotteries that are feasible in the
tree. Here we are using the familiar definition that any two utility functions
y 7→ u(y) and y 7→ u˜(y) are cardinally equivalent just in case there exist an
additive constant α ∈ R and a positive mulitplicative constant ρ ∈ R such
that
u˜(y) = α+ ρu(y) for all y ∈ Y (5)
Thus, the two utility functions y 7→ u(y) and y 7→ u˜(y) are cardinally
equivalent if and only if, for every triple {a, b, c} of consequences in Y , the
ratios of utility differences satisfy
u˜(a)− u˜(c)
u˜(b)− u˜(c) =
u(a)− u(c)
u(b)− u(c) (6)
whenever both denominators are non-zero because b and c are not indifferent.
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3.7 Interpreting Ratios of Utility Differences
Consider the Marschak triangle whose three vertices are the three degenerate
lotteries δy (y ∈ {a, b, c}) in which the particular consequence y occurs with
probability 1. Thus, each point of the triangle corresponds to a unique
lottery λ ∈ ∆(Y ) with the property that
λ({a, b, c}) = λ(a) + λ(b) + λ(c) = 1
As discussed in Hammond (1998, Section 2.3), the ratios on each side of
equation (6) represent the constant slopes of the parallel straight line indif-
ference curves in this triangle, along which expected utility
Eλu = λ(a)u(a) + λ(b)u(b) + λ(c)u(c)
is constant. Indeed, the slopes on each side of equation (6) equal the constant
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between:
1. any increase in the probability λ(a) of getting a that is offset by an
equal decrease in the probability λ(c) of getting c;
2. any increase in the probability λ(b) of getting b that is offset by an
equal decrease in the probability λ(c) of getting c.
Notice that all variations in individuals’ consequences, including general
characteristics that affect their welfare and even their existence, are included
in the extended personal consequence y. Thus, despite the objections of
Broome (1993), we are treating any “cause of preference” — in the sense of
any personal characteristic that affects our ethical judgements of a person’s
wellbeing — as an “object of preference”, including those preferences that
can be regarded as interpersonal comparisons. In fact, any utility function
Y 3 y 7→ u(y) ∈ R in the cardinal equivalence class of von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility functions represents what Tinbergen (1957) and Kolm
(1994) call “fundamental preferences” over the domain Y .18 Indeed, we go
further, and require the expected utility function
∆(Y ) 3 λ 7→ Eλu =
∑
y∈Y λ(y)u(y) (7)
to represent fundamental preferences over the domain ∆(Y ) of lotteries λ.
18Arrow (1977) himself explores a similar concept.
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3.8 General Discrete Lotteries and Bounded Utility
Menger (1934) showed how to modify the well-known St. Petersburg para-
dox so that it applies to any unbounded utility function. This result led
Arrow (1951; 1965, pp. 28–44; 1971, ch. 2; 1972) to insist that utility should
be bounded. Indeed, suppose that expected utility is to be extended to a
continuous function defined not only over simple lotteries whose support is a
finite set of possible outcomes, but also over general discrete lotteries whose
support is a countably infinite set of possible outcomes, including extinction
dates. Then analysis such as that in Hammond (1998, Section 8) shows that
relevant marginal rates of substitution like (6) must be bounded away from
both zero and infinity.
Accordingly, from now on we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. There exist both a common lower bound u and a common
upper bound u¯ > u such that, for all possible consequences y ∈ Y that any
potential individuals may face, one has
u ≤ u(y) ≤ u¯ (8)
4 Basic Framework: Suppes Equity
4.1 Expected Utility in a Biased Original Position
Consider any biased original position in which µi denotes the probability of
becoming the person bearing the numerical label i ∈ Nn. The fundamental
utility function u on Y has been constructed so that, in case there are n
individuals, the ethical decision maker should choose a consequence lottery
λ ∈ ∆(Y n) in order to maximize overall expected utility.
In the biased original position described by µ ∈ ∆(Nn), the relevant ex-
pected utility calculation involves a simple lottery on the Cartesian product
set Y × Nn whose members (y, i) pair a personal consequence y with a nu-
merical label i. The relevant lottery, which we denote by µ ◦ λ, comes from
compounding λ with µ. For every (y, i) in the domain Y ×Nn, the relevant
compound probability is given by
(µ ◦ λ)(y, i) := µi ·margi λ(y) = µi · λi(y) (9)
Here, for each i ∈ Nn, we have followed (3) in using λi to denote the marginal
probability distribution margi λ of i’s random personal consequence.
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Now we can calculate the expected utility derived from a chosen biased
original position µ ∈ ∆(Nn) combined with a chosen lottery consequence
λ ∈ ∆(Y n) as
Eµ◦λ[u(y)] :=
∑
(y,i)∈Y×Nn
(µ ◦ λ)(y, i)u(y) (10)
Finally, we introduce a simplification that comes from realizing that the
joint probability distribution µ ◦ λ on Y × Nn is equivalent to a two-stage
lottery where first i ∈ Nn is determined before i’s personal consequence
yi ∈ Y . This leads to an alternative iterated expected value
Eµ◦λ[u(y)] = Eµ [Eλi [u(yi)]] =
∑
i∈Nn
µi
∑
yi∈Y
λi(yi)u(yi) (11)
of individual expected utilities arising from the relevant personal conse-
quence lotteries λi.
4.2 An Original Position with Suppes Equity
In practice, not even our idealized ethical decision-making agency can choose
what individual it will become upon emerging from behind the veil of igno-
rance. Thus, it must treat the biased original position µ ∈ ∆(Nn) as fixed.
Then it is reduced to choosing λ ∈ ∆(Y n) in order to maximize the function
(11) while treating µ ∈ ∆(Nn) as a fixed vector of probabilistic weights. So
the appropriate objective is the weighted utilitarian Bergson social welfare
function (or BSWF) defined by
∆(Y n) 3 λ 7→W (λ;µ) := Eµ◦λ[u(y)] (12)
For “two-person decision situations” Suppes (1966, definition 5, p. 296)
defines a preference relation that he calls “more just than”. Sen (1970,
Chapter 9*) first offers an extension of Suppes’ definition from 2 persons
to n. Then, after introducing interpersonal comparisons of utility levels into
Suppes’ framework, he relates this extended principle to Rawls’ difference
principle, and the corresponding maximin preference ordering. This relation
was discussed further in Hammond (1976, 1979) and in many subsequent
works by other social choice theorists.
Applied to the weighted utilitarian Bergson social welfare function (12),
a pair of lotteries ν, ρ ∈ ∆(Y n) constitutes a two-person decision situation
just in case there are two individuals j, k ∈ Nn such that for all other persons
i ∈ Nn \ {j, k}, the marginal distributions νi, ρi ∈ ∆(Y ) satisfy νi = ρi. In
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this case equations (12) and (11) imply that the welfare difference between ν
and ρ is
W (ν;µ)−W (ρ;µ) = µj
∑
yj∈Y
[νj(yj)− ρj(yj)]u(yj)
+ µk
∑
yk∈Y
[νk(yk)− ρk(yk)]u(yk) (13)
Now, Suppes equity insists that interchanging the pairs of marginal lotteries
νj , νk and ρj , ρk of these two individuals should have no effect on the social
preference between ν and ρ in ∆(Y n). In other words, we should consider
the new lotteries ν˜, ρ˜ ∈ ∆(Y n) whose marginal distributions ν˜i, ρ˜i ∈ ∆(Y )
satisfy ν˜i = ντ j,k(i) and ρ˜i = ρτ j,k(i) for all i ∈ Nn, where Nn 3 i 7→ τ j,k(i) ∈
Nn is the transposition mapping that interchanges individuals j and k while
leaving all other individuals unaffected. Then Suppes equity requires that
W (ν˜;µ) RW (ρ˜;µ) according as W (ν;µ) RW (ρ;µ) (14)
Evidently (13) is consistent with (14) for all pairs ν, ρ ∈ ∆(Y n) if and only
if µj = µk. Given that µ ∈ ∆(Nn) is a probability distribution, evidently
Suppes equity holds for all pairs of individuals j, k ∈ Nn if and only if the
weights satisfy µi =
1
n for all i ∈ Nn. So instead of the weighted sum (11),
Suppes equity implies that we should have an unweighted utilitarian BSWF
of the form
∆(Y n) 3 λ 7→W (λ) := 1
n
∑
i∈Nn
∑
yi∈Y
λi(yi)u(yi) (15)
This, of course, is precisely the form that Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi
(1953, 1955, 1977, 1978, 1979) advocated, taking the view that the original
position requires the ethical decision maker to be impartial or unbiased in
the sense that all individuals should be given equal weight.
5 Basic Framework: Demographic Consequences
5.1 Variable Numbers and Possible Non-Existence
Up to now we have considered what Parfit (1984) called “same numbers”
problems, where the population of individuals is fixed. To allow for the prob-
ability of extinction, however, we must discuss “variable numbers” problems
where the population varies, and so there are variable “demographic” con-
sequences.
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To accommodate these, we follow Hammond (1988) and also Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson (2005) (henceforth BBD) in assuming that all de-
cisions which only affect the utility of a non-existent individual should be
regarded as indifferent. In fact, in Section 3.3 we already introduced the
assumption that there is one particular personal consequence y0 ∈ Y which
comes about if and only if the person concerned never comes into existence.
Let u0 := u(y0) ∈ R denote the utility level associated with non-existence.
5.2 Avoiding Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”, I
At this point BBD choose a positive critical level of utility that we denote by
uC . This is defined so that, rather than an individual not living at all, it is
better or worse for the society that an individual should live and experience
personal consequence y ∈ Y according as u(y) ≷ uC . For BBD, the alter-
native criterion u(y) ≷ 0 indicates whether a person who actually comes
into existence and experiences personal consequence y would (or should)
personally prefer or disprefer that life to not living at all.
One motivation that BBD give for introducing the positive constant uC
is to avoid the “repugnant conclusion” enunciated by Parfit (1984). This
involves the observation that, in a society of n individuals who all experience
an identical personal consequence y, a total utility social welfare function
would be
N× Y 3 (n, y) 7→ S(n, y) := nu(y) (16)
Such an objective implies that, whenever u(y) > 0, it is always better to
increase n with u(y) fixed. Following Parfit, BBD see this as “repugnant”
when u(y) is close to zero, which is interpreted as indicating a miserable
personal consequence. Their positive critical level uC allows BBD to replace
the objective function (16) with the alternative
N× Y 3 (n, y) 7→ S0(n, y) := n [u(y)− uC ] (17)
By choosing uC far enough above the zero level at which an individual is
thought to be on the margin of preferring not to have be born, the functional
form (17) enables BBD to escape the repugnant conclusion.
5.3 Avoiding Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”, II
By contrast, following Hammond (1988, 1991) and Fleurbaey and Ham-
mond (2004), we normalize the common interpersonally comparable utility
function Y 3 y 7→ u(y) ∈ R so that
u(y0) = 0 (18)
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That is, the critical level is set to zero.
Now consider any fixed personal consequence profile yn as in (2) which
occurs with probability 1. The welfare function defined by (15) takes the
form
1
n
∑
i∈Nn
u(yi) (19)
But the set of individuals who ever exist in this profile is
L(yn) := {i ∈ Nn | yi ∈ Y \ {y0}} (20)
So the normalization (18) obviously reduces (19) to the average utility
1
n
∑
i∈L(yn) u(yi) (21)
over all n individuals, whether or not they exist. This has important impli-
cations later — see especially Section 5.7.
To avoid the repugnant conclusion implied by maximizing (16) when
the constant uC in (17) is zero, we simply need to extend the argument of
Hammond (1988) concerning how to define the zero level of utility. Specifi-
cally, we admit the possibility of personal consequences y ∈ Y that, if they
occurred with certainty, would be so repugnant that any ethical agent like
Adam Smith’s impartial spectator would prefer, ceteris paribus, that the
individual never exist. This is entirely consistent with the utility function
y 7→ u(y) having the property that, for each lottery λ ∈ ∆(Y ), one has∑
y∈Y λ(y)u(y) ≷ 0 according as the society as a whole is made better or
worse off, in the view of the ethical agent, by adding an extra individual
whose random personal consequence ex ante is given by λ. For any personal
consequence satisfying u(y) < 0, the absolute value |u(y)| measures the re-
pugnance that the impartial spectator should feel at seeing any individual
condemned to such a miserable existence.
5.4 Normalized Individual Welfare
Following the terminology of Roberts (1980), it follows that utility is now
measured up to a cardinal ratio scale. This means that the two utility
functions y 7→ u(y) and y 7→ u˜(y) are equivalent just in case there exists a
positive multiplicative constant ρ ∈ R such that u˜(y) = ρ u(y) for all y ∈ Y .
This first normalization excludes additive shifts represented by a non-zero α
in (5).
From now on we ignore the trivial case when u(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y ,
which would imply that all personal consequences are regarded as entirely
24
indifferent to the personal consequence y0 associated with not even exist-
ing. Indeed, it is surely reasonable to assume that there exists at least
one favourable personal consequence y∗ 6= y0 such that u(y∗) > 0 because
ethically it is deemed better to experience y∗ than not to live at all.
5.5 Interpreting Interpersonal Comparisons
Arrow (1977) offered an interpretation of interpersonal comparisons of utility
levels of individual welfare. Indeed, the title he chose there links the paper
to the earlier work in Arrow (1951) on the concept of “extended sympathy”,
though that link is left largely implicit. Here, we have utility measured
on a cardinal ratio scale that gives decision-theoretic meaning not only to
level comparisions of utility, but also to ratios of non-zero utilities. Indeed,
as discussed in Hammond (1991) and Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004), a
comparison u(y) > u(y′) means that experiencing personal consequence y
is better than experiencing personal consequence y′, even if these personal
consequences are experienced by different individuals. Again, this ethical
opinion may be that of an impartial spectator.
On the other hand, because of the normalization u(y0) = 0, given any
two personal consequences y, y′ ∈ Y \ {y0}, the well-defined numerical ratio
u(y)/u(y′) must satisfy
u(y)
u(y′)
=
u(y)− u(y0)
u(y′)− u(y0) (22)
Then, following the discussion following (6) in Section 3.6, this ratio of utility
differences must equal the constant marginal rate of substitution between
any two different net probability shifts that both move probability by the
same absolute amount:
1. away from the non-existence consequence y0;
2. toward personal consequence y, as opposed to y′.
It may bear repeating yet again that this constant marginal rate of substi-
tution should be that of an impartial spectator.
5.6 Average versus Total Utilitarianism
Classical utilitarianism advocates maximizing the expected value of total
utility, given by the classical BSWF defined by
∆(Y n) 3 λ 7→W total(λ) :=
∑
i∈Nn
∑
yi∈Y
λi(yi)u(yi) (23)
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Of course, this objective was already advocated by Hutcheson (1725), who
famously wrote: “That Action is best, which procures the greatest Happi-
ness for the greatest Numbers”.
By contrast, the alternative BSWF (15), where W total(λ) gets divided
by the number of individuals n, looks like average utilitarianism, apparently
first advocated by Edgeworth (1925).19 We note, however, that Sidgwick
(1907, pp. 415–416) wrote earlier as follows:
. . . strictly conceived, the point up to which, on Utilitarian prin-
ciples, population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not
that at which average happiness is the greatest possible . . . but
that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of
persons living by the amount of average happiness reaches its
maximum”.
Evidently, when n is truly fixed, then (15) and (23) are cardinally equiv-
alent functions of λ, so maximizing either is equivalent to maximizing the
other. Yet when population is being affected by policy choices, it is usual
to interpret this as choosing n.
As argued in Hammond (1988), in decision trees where population is
being chosen, maximizing the average utilitarian criterion (15) will be dy-
namically consistent only if the chosen population size n is calculated after
keeping track of all the individuals who ever existed, starting from a date
no later than the beginning of the planning process. This requires that the
number n never be updated. Far in the future, we will have to count the
number of long-dead ancestors who should otherwise be entirely forgotten.
5.7 Average Utility in an Expanded Population
There is also a more direct argument that justifies the classical or total util-
itarian criterion (23). Recall that we have defined n as the total number of
potential individuals in each consequence profile yn ∈ Y n. These potential
individuals include all those i ∈ Nn who never come into existence in the per-
sonal consequence profile yn ∈ Y n because their own personal consequence
is y0.
Consider now a population of size m which is much larger than n, and
an expanded consequence domain Y n × {y0}m−n of personal consequence
19See also Yaari (1981). In this connection, Harsanyi’s work is generally interpreted as
supporting average utilitarianism. The difference between classical and average utilitari-
anism also receives attention in Arrow, Dasgupta and Ma¨ler (2003).
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profiles ym = 〈yi〉mi=1 that, for all i ∈ Nm \Nn = {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . ,m−1,m},
satisfy yi = y0 and so u(yi) = 0.
In the Suppes version of the original position, where there is a proba-
bility 1/m of becoming any individual, the expected welfare of the social
consequence ym ∈ Y n × {ym−n0 } is
W avem (y
m) :=
1
m
∑
i∈Nm
u(yi) =
n
m
1
n
∑
i∈Nn
u(yi) (24)
where the last equality holds because yi = y0 and so u(yi) = 0 for all
i ∈ Nm \ Nn. Hence
W avem (y
m) =
n
m
1
n
∑
i∈Nn
u(yi) =
n
m
W aven (y
n) (25)
where the last term is the product of:
• the probability n/m of being among the n individuals out of m who
might ever exist;
• the conditional expected utility W aven (yn) of being in an original posi-
tion in a potential population consisting of those n individuals.
Multiplying each side of (25) by the positive constant m gives
mW avem (y
m) =
∑
i∈Nm
u(yi) =
∑
i∈Nn
u(yi) = nW
ave
n (y
n) (26)
and so
W totalm (y
m) =
∑
i∈Nm
u(yi) =
∑
i∈Nn
u(yi) = W
total
n (y
n) (27)
In particular, the first expression in (27) is independent ofm provided thatm
is large enough. So, to be sure of including all potential individuals, we take
the limit as m → ∞. Then, on the understanding that yi = y0 and so
u(yi) = 0 for all i > n, an appropriate maximand is the total utilitarian
welfare function
W total∞ (y
N) :=
∑∞
i=1
u(yi) =
∑n
i=1
u(yi) (28)
of the infinite personal consequence profile yN that belongs to the Cartesian
product Y N of a countably infinite set of copies of Y .
Note that in the Suppes original position, as n increases, so does the
probability n/m of coming into existence, no matter how large m may be.
This is reflected in the total utilitarian objective (28), but not in the average
utilitarian objective
W aven (y
N) =
1
n
∑n
i=1
u(yi) (29)
where n is being chosen.
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6 Toward Intergenerational Equity
6.1 Unbounded Population
Up to now, we have really considered only finite-dimensional personal con-
sequence profiles of the form ym ∈ Y m, or the derived utility streams
um = um(ym) = 〈u(yi)〉mi=1 ∈ Rm (30)
Here m is a finite upper bound on the number of individuals who might ever
exist.
At the end of Section 5.7, however, we did consider the total utilitarian
sum (28) in which the infinite sum
∑∞
i=1 u(yi) collapsed to the finite sum∑n
i=1 u(yi) because we took the case when, for all i > n, one has yi = y0
and so u(yi) = 0. Yet the debate between Ramsey, Koopmans and Arrow
(inter alia) revolves entirely around what to do when potentially there are
infinitely many individuals, in infinitely many generations.
So from now on, instead of finite-dimensional personal consequence pro-
files, we consider infinite-dimensional personal consequence sequences or
streams
yN = 〈yi〉i∈N ∈ Y N =
∏
i∈N Yi (31)
Note that we are not presuming that an infinite set of individuals will come
into existence. Rather, given any finite m ∈ N, there could be a positive
probability of a stream yN for which there exists some i > m for whom i
could exist, and so yi 6= y0.
6.2 Generational Structures
The issue that concerned Arrow (1999a, b) was whether one should discount
the lives of individuals who belong to future generations. To discuss this
formally, we need to define the concept of generation in our framework.
This involves recognizing that when individuals are born depends upon the
personal consequence stream yN ∈ Y N, which is of course influenced by
policy choices.
Accordingly, let T denote the set of possible times or dates. Like the
labels of the set of potential individuals, it is taken to be a copy of N, the
countably infinite set of natural numbers. Corresponding to each time t ∈ T
and each consequence profile yN ∈ Y N, there is a generation Gt(yN) ⊂ N,
which may be thought of as the finite set of numerical labels of all individuals
born at date t when the consequence profile is yN. Since birth implies coming
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into existence, one has
i ∈ ∪t∈TGt(yN) =⇒ yi 6= y0 (32)
Definition 1. A generational structure is a sequence GT = 〈Gt〉t∈T of
pairwise disjoint finite subsets of N that satisfy:
1. either Gt 6= ∅ for all t ∈ T , or there exists a finite horizon H ∈ T such
that Gt 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ t ≤ H;
2. for each t ∈ T such that Gt 6= ∅, there exists a pair at, bt ∈ N such
that Gt is the set N∩ [at, bt] of bt−at+1 consecutive natural numbers,
where b0 = 0 and then, for t = 1, 2, 3, . . .: (i) the first member of
generation Gt is at = bt−1 + 1; (ii) the last member of generation Gt
is bt = at+1 − 1.
An implicit assumption here is that, after the first time t at which gen-
eration Gt has no members, all subsequent generations are also empty. This
seems relatively harmless. The following result will be used later.
Lemma 1. For every generational structure GT :
1. for every s ∈ T , one has ∪st=1Gt = {1, 2, . . . , bs} ⊂ N;
2. if Gt 6= ∅ for all t ∈ T , then ∪t∈TGt = N.
Proof. Part 1 of Lemma 1 is obvious from Part 2 of Definition 1.
Also, because Gt ⊂ N for all t ∈ T , one must have ∪t∈TGt ⊆ N.
Conversely, in case Gt 6= ∅ for all t ∈ T , for each s ∈ T = N one must
have s ≤ # ∪st=1 Gt = bt, by Part 1 of Lemma 1. But then Part 2 of
Definition 1 evidently implies that s ∈ ∪st=1Gt ⊂ ∪t∈TGt. This proves that
N ⊆ ∪t∈TGt.
From now on, we assume that individual i ∈ N can exist in the personal
consequence stream yN ∈ Y N if and only if i belongs to a generation Gt(yN).
Furthermore, the date t ∈ T at which individual i ∈ N is born, and so the
generation Gt(y
N) to which i belongs, can only be affected by the personal
consequences of people who belong to a preceding generation. That is, there
can be no backward causation in creating new generations. Formally:
Assumption 2. For each consequence stream yN = 〈yi〉i∈N ∈ Y N there ex-
ists a unique generational structure GT (yN) := 〈Gt(yN)〉t∈T with the property
that i ∈ ∪t∈TGt(yN)⇐⇒ yi 6= y0 and also GT (yN) = N ∩ [at(yN), bt(yN)].
Moreover, given any pair yN, y˜N ∈ Y N of alternative consequence profiles,
if yi = y˜i for all i ≤ bt−1(yN) = at(yN)− 1, then Gt(yN) = Gt(y˜N).
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6.3 Generational Welfare
To define the welfare of each generation Gt, we consider the domains of:
1. one-generation situations in the form of a pair yN, y˜N ∈ Y N of conse-
quence streams for which there exists t ∈ T such that:
(a) Gt(y
N) = Gt(y˜
N);
(b) for all i 6∈ Gt(yN) = Gt(y˜N) one has yi = y˜i.
2. intragenerational decision problems each in the form of a finite feasible
set F ⊆ Y N of consequence profiles having the property that there exist
a time t ∈ T , a fixed single generation G¯t ⊆ N at time t, and a fixed
consequence stream y¯N ∈ Y N such that
yN ∈ F =⇒ Gt(yN) = G¯t and yi = y¯i for all i 6∈ G¯t
Of course, a one-generation situation is a special case of an intragen-
erational decision problem. All are decision problems that have a domain
of personal consequences for the individuals in G¯t, whereas individuals in
all other generations face the fixed personal consequence profile 〈y¯i〉i∈N\G¯t .
For this domain, after ignoring the constant sum
∑
i∈N\G¯t u(y¯i), our total
utilitarian social welfare function (28) can be reduced to the equivalent in-
tragenerational welfare function
Wt(y
G¯t) :=
∑
i∈G¯t
u(yi) (33)
for generation G¯t. This notation, however, does not reflect how the popula-
tion Gt(y
N) of the tth generation depends in principle on the entire personal
consequence stream yN. To recognize this dependence, we consider instead
the function
Wt(y
N) :=
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi) (34)
By Definition 1 and Assumption 2, the generation Gt(y
N) born at each date
t ∈ T is finite. So the function Y N 3 yN 7→ Wt(yN) is well defined on the
entire Cartesian product space Y N.
6.4 Intergenerational Welfare
Using the definition (34), the infinite sum (28) of all potential individuals’
utilities can be expressed as the sum
W total∞ (y
N) =
∑∞
i=1
u(yi) =
∑∞
t=1
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi) =
∑∞
t=1
Wt(y
N) (35)
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of the infinite sequence of all generations’ welfare levels.
An obvious special case occurs when there is a specified finite horizon
or extinction date H with the property that, for all yN ∈ Y N and all i ∈
∪t>HGt(yN), the only feasible consequence satisfies yi = y0, thus precluding
the possibility that any individual i could ever be born after date H. In
effect, this is a restriction on the consequence domain and so on the domain
of permissible decision trees.
In this case one has u(yi) ≡ 0 whenever i ∈ ∪t>HGt(yN). It follows that,
for all permissible personal consequence profiles yN, the total utilitarian
objective (28) can be written as the finite sum
W totalH (y
N) =
∑H
t=1
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi) =
∑H
t=1
Wt(y
N) (36)
of the welfare levels for the first H generations, as defined by (34).
6.5 Total Utilitarianism
Faced with the objections to discounting raised by Sidgwick and Ramsey,
not to mention the violation of the Suppes equity criterion, it may be worth
trying to define intergenerational welfare as the unweighted sum of different
generations’ welfare, not only with a finite horizon H, as in (36), but also
with an infinite horizon. That is, one considers the infinite sum
W total∞ (y
N) :=
∑∞
i=1
u(yi) (37)
introduced in (28), even when there is no upper bound n on the number of
individuals who may come into existence.
Now, convergence of (37) with infitely many individuals requires that one
must have u(yi)→ 0 as i→∞. This is a version of Parfit’s (1984) “repug-
nant conclusion”, which we discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Nevertheless,
one may be able to avoid such repugnance. Indeed, suppose that the per-
sonal consequence stream yN has the property that the finite sum W totalH (y
N)
given by (36) reaches a maximum w.r.t. H at a particular extinction date
H∗. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, even if eventual extinction could
somehow be prevented, it would be better to allow it to occur anyway. In
other words, extinction would become the only acceptable escape from the
repugnant conclusion.
6.6 Ramsey on a Restricted Domain
In (8) of Section 3.8 we introduced the assumption justified by Arrow (1951,
1965, 1971, 1972) that the common utility function y 7→ u(y) of each indi-
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vidual i ∈ N should be bounded both above and below. In particular, there
should be an upper bound u¯. Inspired by Ramsey (1928) and especially by
Gale (1967, p. 11), consider now the restricted domain D ⊂ Y N of “good”
personal consequence streams yN for which, by definition, the expected sum∑
i∈N[u(yi)− u¯] (38)
of non-positive terms is bounded below, and so converges.20 For finite deci-
sion trees with consequence profiles in the domain D, the axioms of Section
3.6, when combined with Suppes equity and the treatment in Section 5
of demographic consequences, together imply that behaviour in any finite
decision tree whose consequences are all “good” should maximize the well-
defined expected value of (38).
Such “good” consequence streams, however, are likely to be rare, espe-
cially in a world where past choices have already committed current genera-
tions to future climate change. After all, the series in (38) is bounded below
only if the utilities u(yi) of successive personal consequences yi to converge
to the upper bound u¯ as i → ∞. In particular, infinitely many individuals
must come into existence, and yet their utilities must converge over time
to the upper bound u¯. This is surely the antithesis of Parfit’s repugnant
conclusion.
6.7 Overtaking, Catching Up, and Beyond
Suppose that
∑n
i=1[u(yi)−u¯] diverges to −∞ for all feasible yN ∈ Y N, mean-
ing that there are no good consequence streams. In this case the domain D
is empty, so maximizing the expected value of (38) is meaningless. This has
led several researchers to suggest alternative concepts of social preference.
First, von Weizsa¨cker (1965) suggested the overtaking criterion, later
axiomatized by Brock (1970). Extended to our framework with risky conse-
quences, this states that one extended lottery λ ∈ ∆∗(Y N) should be strictly
preferred to an alternative extended lottery µ ∈ ∆∗(Y N) just in case there
exists h ∈ N such that, for all n > h, the successive differences in total
expected values satisfy∑
yN∈Y N [λ(y
N)− µ(yN)]
∑n
i=1
u(yi) > 0 (39)
To make it compatible with maximizing (38) when there are good conse-
quences, Gale (1967) introduced the weaker catching up criterion, according
20Ramsey (1928) used a continuous time version of this objective.
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to which λ ∈ ∆∗(Y N) should be weakly preferred to µ ∈ ∆∗(Y N) just in case
lim inf
n→∞
∑
yN∈Y N [λ(y
N)− µ(yN)]
∑n
i=1
u(yi) ≥ 0 (40)
Very recently Jonsson and Voorneveld (2018) have introduced limited
discounted utilitarianism (LDU), based on the mathematical concept of Abel
summation. Their LDU criterion states that λ should be weakly preferred
to µ just in case, as the discount factor δ tends to 1 from below, the limit
infimum of the difference in the respective expected discounted sum of all
generations’ total welfare levels satisfies
lim inf
δ→1−
∑
yN∈Y N [λ(y
N)− µ(yN)]
∑∞
t=1
δt
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi) ≥ 0 (41)
It has been argued on pragmatic grounds, by Peter Diamond and oth-
ers, that an appropriate welfare criterion would focus, ceteris paribus, on
short-run consequences, without worrying unduly about existence or com-
pleteness over an infinite horizon. In this spirit, the decade of the 1970s saw
several other proposed criteria for planning over an infinite horizon. These
include the “agreeable plans” considered by Hammond and Mirrlees (1973)
and Hammond (1975), where the loss from not knowing a true finite horizon
in advance would tend to zero as the notice of the true horizon tends to
infinity.21 The concept of a “fairly good” plan due to Mirrlees and Stern
(1972) was similar; the main difference was in measuring the loss, not as a
loss of utility, but as something related to Debreu’s (1951) “coefficient of re-
source utilitization” applied to the quantity of the only capital good in their
framework. Finally, instead of infinite horizon agreeable plans, Hammond
(1973, chs. 9–10; 1974) considered the relative performance of finite horizon
“overtures”, based on how they could be extended into plans for arbitrarily
long finite horizons.
To conclude this section, we remark that none of these procedures pro-
vides a satisfactory way of dealing with the “cake eating problem” set out
in Gale (1967, p. 4, Example 2). We also recall Chichilnisky’s (1997; 2009b,
p. 17) important reminder that von Weizsa¨cker’s overtaking criterion does
not give a complete preference ordering; nor do any of the other criteria
considered in this section. This incompleteness can lead to behaviour in an
unfolding decision tree that contradicts the key second and third axioms of
Section 3.6, thus leading to unpredictable consequences. In particular, such
unpredictability in an entirely deterministic decision tree seems normatively
unacceptable.
21See also Hammond and Kennan (1979) for related ideas, and Osumi (1986) for a
general synthesis that, inter alia, embraces results for both discrete and continuous time.
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6.8 Discounted Welfare for an Infinite Horizon
The following definition gives, for a suitably restricted domain, a discounted
version of the infinite sum (35) in Section 6.4.
Definition 2. Let βT = 〈βt〉∞t=1 ∈ RN++ denote any infinite sequence of pos-
itive discount factors. For each βT ∈ RN++, the discounted total population
is defined as the discounted sum
N(yN;βT ) :=
∑∞
t=1
βt#Gt(y
N) (42)
of the numbers of individuals in each future generation, which may be infi-
nite. Let
D(βT ) := {yN ∈ Y N | N(yN;βT ) < +∞} (43)
denote the set of personal consequence streams for which the discounted total
population is finite. On this domain, define the discounted intergenerational
welfare criterion as the function
D(βT ) 3 yN 7→ V (yN;βT ) :=
∑∞
t=1
βt
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi) (44)
Of course, for (44) to be a true discounted sum, the discount factors βt
should decrease with t. We will not impose this requirement, however.
In the debate between Ramsey on one side and Arrow on the other,
both focused on the important special case when each generation consists
of a single representative individual — i.e., for all t ∈ T and yN ∈ Y N, one
has #Gt(y
N) = 1. Then a necessary and sufficient condition for the infinite
wighted sum
∑∞
t=1 βtu(yt) of bounded utilities to converge absolutely for all
yN ∈ Y N without restriction is the familiar requirement that∑∞t=1 βt < +∞.
More generally, however, when for instance the size #Gt(y
N) of suc-
cessive generations can be steadily growing, the domain D(βT ) on which
the discounted objective function yN 7→ V (yN;βT ) specified by (44) is well
defined depends on the sequence βT . Indeed:
Proposition 1. Given any fixed βT ∈ RN++, the infinite series specified
by (44) converges absolutely for every yN in the restricted domain D(βT )
specified by (43).
Proof. As stated in (8), Assumption 1 implies the double inequality u ≤
u(y) ≤ u¯ for all y ∈ Y , with u(y0) = 0. Define the bound B := max{−u, u¯}.
Then the double inequality implies that for all yN ∈ Y N and all i ∈ N one
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has |u(yi)| ≤ B. So provided that yN ∈ D(βT ) and so N(yN;βT ) < +∞,
summing over all i ∈ N while using definition (42) gives∑∞
t=1
βt
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
|u(yi)| ≤
∑∞
t=1
βt #Gt(y
N)B = N(yN;βT )B (45)
This confirms absolute convergence.
6.9 Why Not Discount the Welfare of Future Generations?
In the case when the total population is n, a finite number, the Suppes
equity principle that was introduced in Section 4.2 provides one reason for
choosing the unweighted sum (28) in Section 5.7. Apart from the informal
argument set out in Section 2.3, our main case for choosing the undiscounted
objective (37) over the discounted objective (44) is the idea that having an
infinite horizon does not seem a good enough reason by itself to abandon the
Suppes equity principle. Especially in our setting where even the discounted
objective (44) is only defined on the restricted domain D(βT ).
Another argument for favouring the undiscounted sum (37) is based on
the fact that the discounted sum (44) violates the usual strict Pareto prin-
ciple defined below:
Definition 3. The general infinite horizon von Neumann–Morgenstern wel-
fare objective Y N 3 yN 7→ V (yN) ∈ R satisfies:
1. the strict Pareto criterion just in case, whenever the two consequence
streams yN, y˜N ∈ Y N satisfy
(a) u(yi) = u(y˜i) for all i ∈ N, then V (yN) = V (y˜N);
(b) u(yi) ≥ u(y˜i) for all i ∈ N, then V (yN) ≥ V (y˜N), with V (yN) >
V (y˜N) except when u(yi) = u(y˜i) for all i ∈ N;
2. the restricted Pareto criterion just in case it satisfies the strict Pareto
criterion whenever the two consequence streams yN, y˜N ∈ Y N are re-
stricted to satisfy Gt(y
N) = Gt(y˜
N) for all t ∈ T .
The reason why (44) violates the strict Pareto principle is that the weight
attached to the individual who is given the number i is βt, for the unique
date t such that i ∈ Gt(yN). Of course, this t is the date at which the ith
individual is born when the personal consequence sequence is yN. Typically,
of course, the relative weights of any two numbered individuals i, j ∈ N
therefore depend on yN. This reflects the failure to give each numbered
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individual i ∈ N a proper identity until one specifies the generation Gt(yN)
to which i belongs when the personal consequence stream is yN.
By contrast, the restricted Pareto condition defined in the second part
of Definition 3 applies only when each individual’s generation is not affected
by the choice between yN and y˜N. Of course, in the special case when each
numbered individual i ∈ N has a fixed date of birth, and so Gt(yN) = Gt,
independent of yN, then the restricted Pareto criterion coincides with the
strict Pareto criterion. Indeed, in this special case, the restricted domain
(43) becomes
D(GT ) := {yN ∈ Y N |
∑∞
t=1
βt#Gt < +∞} (46)
which depends only on the constant generational structure. On this domain,
the discounted sum (44) takes the form
V (yN;βT ) =
∑∞
t=1
βt
∑
i∈Gt
u(yi) (47)
We remark that this is a biased original position of the kind discussed in
Section 3.5, with the probability of becoming any particular individual i ∈
Gt given by
µi = βt/
∑∞
s=1
βs #Gs (48)
7 Sustainability
7.1 Sustainable Development: Motivation
There is by now an overwhelming scientific consensus that the world risks
being engulfed by climate change — see Stern (2006, 2008, 2013, 2015) for
a review of the relevant literature. Even humanity’s future viability could
be at stake. Recognizing this threat takes us well beyond what had previ-
ously been the usual realm of social choice or economic theory. Indeed, the
problem pits increases in present consumption against increases in the like-
lihood of future existence. This brings a new sense of urgency to Ramsey’s
famous ethical objection to discounting, anticipated somewhat by Sidgwick
and Pigou.
This has propelled the nations of the world to contemplate the practi-
cal implications of the theoretical issue regarding discounting that Ramsey,
Suppes, Koopmans and Arrow, amongst others, disputed some time ago. In
Brundtland (1987), sustainable development was famously defined as:
36
. . . development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.
Later, after the UN General Assembly had asked for a report on the
progress toward sustainable development, in June 1992 the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, or the “Earth Sum-
mit”) was convened in Rio De Janeiro. That was where 162 nations adopted
and signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). That same year saw the creation of the Group of 20, consist-
ing of the 19 nations with the world’s largest economies, plus the European
Union at a time when it consisted of 12 member states. In the charter
of the new G20, Sustainable Development was identified as the top prior-
ity of international economic development. Subsequently, in the year 2015
when the period covered by its Millennium Development Goals was expiring,
the United Nations held a Sustainable Development Summit at which these
goals were replaced with a new document entitled “Transforming our world:
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”.
7.2 Sustainable Development and Maximin
Decades before Brundtland (1987), Hicks (1946, p. 174) had an idea similar
to sustainability when he defined an individual’s “income” as
. . . the maximum amount of money which the individual can
spend this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same
amount in real terms in each ensuing week.
In this spirit, and following Solow (1991, 2012), sustainability might be
defined as giving each generation access to an opportunity set that allows
it to be no worse off than it would have been with the opportunity set that
was available to any of its predecessors. This suggests trying to maximize
the initial generation’s welfare level subject to monotone sustainability —
i.e., requiring successive generations’ welfare levels to be non-decreasing over
time.22
In many settings an efficient development path turns out to be monotone
sustainable if and only if it satisfies the “Rawlsian maximin” criterion of
maximizing the minimum welfare level over all future generations. This
criterion for optimal saving was first used in the independent contributions
22For a fuller discussion of sustainability in this sense, see inter alia Hammond (1993)
as well as Pezzey (1997, p. 451) and Asheim (2007).
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of Arrow (1973b) and, in the continuous time case, of Solow (1974). In many
cases, the maximin path will be “regular” in the sense that all successive
generations have the same utility, as in Burmeister and Hammond (1977).
For an interesting special case, any regular maximin path in continuous time
can be characterized by “Hartwick’s rule” for resource depletion, requiring
all rents from exhaustible resource to be invested in new capital stock —
see Hartwick (1977) as well as Dixit, Hammond and Hoel (1980) and, for
extensive and enlightening discussions of some basic issues, Heal (1998) and
Asheim (2007). More recently, Llavador, Roemer and Silvestre (2010, 2011,
2015) have made maximin utility a key feature of their discussion of optimal
policies in the face of climate change.
7.3 Interpersonal Leximin
The growth literature on sustainability described above focused on gener-
ations. Then, however, a regular maximin path on which each generation
has the same welfare level is consistent with some members of each genera-
tion facing very bad personal consequences. Indeed, while the phrase from
paragraph 1 of chapter 2 of the Brundtland Report that was reproduced in
Section 7.1 has often been quoted, much less attention has been devoted to
this sentence from paragraph 4:
Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all
and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations
for a better life.23
Thus, especially in this paper on social choice, rather than the intergenera-
tional maximin criterion that maximizes the infimum
inf
t∈T
wt
(
〈yi〉i∈Gt(yN)
)
(49)
over all generations’ welfare levels, instead it seems both better and simpler
to apply the interpersonal maximin criterion that maximizes the infimum
inf
i∈N
u(yi) (50)
over all persons’ utility levels. We discuss only the maximand (50) from now
on. Moreover, we consider a social welfare ordering % defined on the domain
23This calls to mind the Basic Needs Model of the Bariloche Foundation in Argentina,
which had been developed by an interdisciplinary team led by Amilcar Herrera that also
included GC. See Herrera et al. (1976) and Chichilnisky (1977).
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[u, u¯]N of utility sequences uN ∈ RN that are uniformly bounded below by u
and above by u¯.
Recall that, following Arrow (1963), social choice theory typically uses
the weak Pareto condition
uN  u˜N =⇒ uN  u˜N (51)
rather than the strict Pareto condition
uN > u˜N =⇒ uN  u˜N (52)
which Diamond (1965) called “sensitivity”.24 Evidently maximin satisfies
the weak condition (51) for a finite set of individuals. It need not, however,
with an infinite set of individuals because the strict inequality uN  u˜N in
the antecedent of (51) can hold even when infi u˜i = infi ui.
In order to strengthen the maximin criterion to satisfy the strict Pareto
condition (52) in a finite population, Rawls (1971) himself suggested that
one should consider “leximin” — i.e., the lexicographic extension of max-
imin. In a finite population of m individuals, for each rank r ∈ Nm we can
define the rth lowest utility level `r(u
Nm), breaking ties arbitrarily. Then the
lexicographic strict ordering >L on the m-dimensional space Rm is defined
so that
uNm >L u˜
Nm ⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ Nm : `r(uNm) = `r(u˜Nm)
for r = 1, 2, . . . k − 1 and `k(uNm) > `k(u˜Nm) (53)
Finally, the leximin rule requires maximizing the complete and transitive
weak preference ordering defined by
uNm % u˜Nm ⇐⇒ ¬[u˜Nm >L uNm ] (54)
A fundamental difficulty in extending the leximin rule to infinite utility
streams in RN comes in defining appropriate ranks on an infinite sequence,
especially one that has no minimum element. These issues have been care-
fully discussed by, amongst others, Asheim (2007, 2010), Asheim, Mitra and
Tungodden (2012), Zuber and Asheim (2012), as well as Asheim and Zuber
(2013).
24We adopt the notational convention that uN  u˜N ⇐⇒ ui > u˜i for all i ∈ N, whereas
uN > u˜N ⇐⇒ ui ≥ u˜i for all i ∈ N, with uN 6= u˜N.
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7.4 Sustainable Welfare Criteria
Rather than sustainable plans that maximize a particular welfare criterion
like leximin, Chichilnisky (1996) pioneered the study of sustainable welfare
criteria, introduceing two axioms which require that neither the present
nor the future should play a dictatorial role. GC also characterized all the
“sustainable” welfare criteria that these axioms imply. Such preferences
exist, are readily computable, and have several other desirable properties.
In the framework of this paper, it is natural to consider sustainable
preferences over lotteries with infinite-horizon sequences yN ∈ Y N of per-
sonal consequences as outcomes. Moreover, the relevant welfare criterion
should be the expected value of some uniformly bounded von Neumann–
Morgenstern social utility function
Y N ⊇ D 3 yN 7→ V (yN) ∈ R (55)
defined on a possibly restricted domain D of personal consequence streams
yN that belong to the countably infinite Cartesian product set Y N. Moreover,
the function yN 7→ V (yN) should satisfy the restricted Pareto criterion set
out in part 2 of definition 3.
7.5 Definition of Temporal Dictatorship
Following Chichilnisky (1996, pp. 240–241), a “dictatorship of the present” is
a welfare criterion which, after some generation that depends on the choices
at hand, is insensitive to the welfare of all succeeding generations. In other
words, a dictatorship of the present occurs if a strict preference for one
personal consequence stream yN over an alternative stream y˜N cannot be
overturned by any changes in these two streams that affect only sufficiently
distant generations.
By contrast, a “dictatorship of the future” is insensitive to the welfare
of the present, disregarding the welfare of all generations that precede some
generation. In other words, a dictatorship of the future occurs if a strict pref-
erence for one personal consequence stream yN over an alternative stream y˜N
cannot be overturned by any changes in these two streams that affect only
generations that are sufficiently close to the present.
Using alternative terminology suggested by Heal (1998, p. 69), a cri-
terion displaying dictatorship of the present is insensitive to the long-run
future; whereas one displaying dictatorship of the future is insensitive to the
present. We claim that neither form of temporal dictatorship is ethically ac-
ceptable. Somewhat surprisingly, it is relatively easy to find welfare criteria
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that are sustainable in the sense that both forms of temporal dictatorship
are avoided.
To complete this section, we adapt Chichilnisky’s original formal defini-
tions of both forms of temporal dictatorship to the setting here, where the
generational structure GT depends on the personal consequence stream yN.
Definition 4. A welfare criterion V : D → R on the domain D ⊆ Y N is a
dictatorship of the present if for all pairs yN, y˜N ∈ D with V (yN) > V (y˜N),
there exists a date s = s(yN, y˜N) ∈ T such that whenever the pair zN, z˜N ∈ Y N
satisfies
i ∈ ∪st=1Gt(yN) =⇒ zi = yi and i ∈ ∪st=1Gt(y˜N) =⇒ z˜i = y˜i (56)
then zN, z˜N ∈ D and V (zN) > V (z˜N).
Definition 5. A welfare criterion V : D → R on the domain D ⊆ Y N is a
dictatorship of the future if for all pairs yN, y˜N ∈ D with V (yN) > V (y˜N),
there exists a date s = s(yN, y˜N) ∈ N such that whenever the pair zN, z˜N ∈ Y N
satisfies
i ∈ ∪∞t=sGt(yN) =⇒ zi = yi and i ∈ ∪∞t=sGt(y˜N) =⇒ z˜i = y˜i (57)
then zN, z˜N ∈ D and V (zN) > V (z˜N).
Note that the only difference between these two definitions concerns the
conditions (56) and (57). These determine whether the strict preference
between two personal consequence streams remains unchanged after alter-
ations in the consequence streams only for all generations that originate
either: (i) after date s, so sufficiently far into the future; or (ii) before
date s, so sufficiently close to the present.
7.6 Two Examples of Temporal Dictatorship
Our first example extends to our framework the argument in Chichilnisky
(1996) that discounting the utilities of future generations leads to a dicta-
torship of the present.
Example 1. For any sequence of discount factors βT ∈ RT++, consider the
restricted domain D(βT ) specified by (43) in Section 6.8, and the infinite-
horizon discounted welfare criterion D(βT ) 3 yN 7→ V (yN;βT ) ∈ R, which is
defined by (44). To show that this criterion is a dictatorship of the present,
let yN, y˜N ∈ D(βT ) be any two personal consequence streams which satisfy
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V (yN;βT )−V (y˜N;βT ) =: δ > 0. By definition (43), because yN, y˜N ∈ D(βT ),
one can choose s ∈ N sufficiently large to ensure that∑∞
t=s
βt
[
#Gt(y
N) + #Gt(y˜
N)
]
< 12δ/(u¯− u) (58)
Consider next two more personal consequence streams zN, z˜N ∈ D(βT ) that
satisfy (56) for this particular value of s ∈ N. By definition (44), one has
V (zN;βT )− V (z˜N;βT )
=
∑∞
t=1
βt
[∑
i∈Gt(zN)
u(zi)−
∑
i∈Gt(z˜N)
u(z˜i)
]
(59)
By Assumption 2 in Section 6.2, for all t ≤ s it follows from (56) that
Gt(z
N) = Gt(y
N) and Gt(z˜
N) = Gt(y˜
N) and also
V (zN;βT )− V (z˜N;βT ) = V (yN;βT )− V (y˜N;βT ) + Σs = δ + Σs (60)
where Σs is defined as the discounted sum∑∞
t=s
βt
[∑
i∈Gt(yN)
[u(zi)− u(yi)]−
∑
i∈Gt(y˜N)
[u(z˜i)− u(y˜i)]
]
(61)
of differences between: (i) the total welfare change of all individuals from
generation s on when consequence stream yN is replaced by zN; (ii) the cor-
responding total welfare change when consequence stream y˜N is replaced by
z˜N.
Now the boundedness assumption (8) implies that for all y, y′ ∈ Y one
has both u(y) ≥ u and −u(y′) ≥ −u¯, so
u(y)− u(y′) ≥ u− u¯ = −(u¯− u) (62)
It follows from (62) and definition (61) that
Σs ≥ −
∑∞
t=s
βt
[
#Gt(y
N) + #Gt(y˜
N)
]
(u¯− u) (63)
So choosing s to satisfy (58) implies that Σs > −12δ. Then (60) implies that
V (zN;βT )− V (z˜N;βT ) > δ − 12δ = 12δ > 0 (64)
This confirms that there is a dictatorship of the present.
Our second example is a simple adaptation of the result due to Chichil-
nisky (1997) concerning dictatorship of the future.
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Example 2. Because of the boundedness assumption (8), the two alternative
welfare criteria
V∗(yN) := lim inf
i→∞
u(yi) and V
∗(yN) := lim sup
i→∞
u(yi) (65)
are both well defined on the unrestricted domain Y N of all personal conse-
quence streams. Indeed, for all yN ∈ Y N one has
u ≤ V∗(yN) ≤ V ∗(yN) ≤ u¯ (66)
Also, given any yN ∈ Y N and any s ∈ N, consider the set ∪st=1Gt(yN) of all
individuals who, given the personal consequence sequence yN, make up the
first s generations. Then it is obvious that, for all i in this set, both values
V∗(yN) and V ∗(yN) are independent of yi. Hence the two welfare criteria
Y N 3 yN 7→ V∗(yN) and Y N 3 yN 7→ V ∗(yN) both display dictatorship of the
future.
7.7 Sustainable von Neumann–Morgenstern Social Utility
Chichilnisky’s (1996) definition of sustainable preferences applies when:
1. consequences and their utilities are determinate;
2. the generational structure is equivalent to one where there is one rep-
resentative individual for each generation;
3. the relevant welfare criterion is a (complete and transitive) preference
ordering over the domain of all possible utility streams which is also
“sensitive”, in the sense of satisfying the strict Pareto criterion.
The following definition adapts that of Chichilnisky (1996) to the current
setting where the social objective is the expected value of a von Neumann–
Morgenstern social utility function which is defined on a restricted domain
D ⊂ Y N, and where each admissible ex post personal consequence stream
yN ∈ D determines a corresponding generation structure GT (yN).
Definition 6. Given a restricted domain D ⊂ Y N of admissible personal
consequence streams, a sustainable von Neumann–Morgenstern social utility
function is a mapping D 3 yN 7→ V (yN) ∈ R which:
1. satisfies the restricted Pareto criterion set out in part 2 of definition 3;
2. is neither a dictatorship of the present, nor a dictatorship of the future.
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The following example offers a two-dimensional parametric class of sus-
tainable preferences.
Example 3. For each stream of discount factors βT ∈ RT++, consider the
restricted domain D(βT ) specified by (43) of personal consequence streams
yN ∈ Y N for which the total discounted population is finite. Then, for any
pair of parameters α ∈ [0, 1] and ω ∈ (0, 1), consider the von Neumann–
Morgenstern welfare function
D(βT ) 3 yN 7→ Ψ(yN;βT , α, ω) := (1− ω)
∑
t∈T βt
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi)
+ ω
[
α lim inf
i→∞
u(yi) + (1− α) lim sup
i→∞
u(yi)
]
(67)
This puts positive weight 1− ω on the first term, which is a dictatorship of
the present, and positive weight ω on the second term, which is a dictatorship
of the future. The strict convex combination of these two defines sustainable
preferences. The welfare function satisfies the restricted Pareto criterion
introduced in Definition 3 of Section 6.9.
Note that the second term of (67) is an asymptotic form of the “Hurwicz
criterion” for decisions under uncertainty that was discussed, inter alia, in
Arrow and Hurwicz (1972). Here the parameter α can be regarded as a
“coefficient of pessimism”.
Going beyond Example 3, Chichilnisky (1996) characterizes sustainable
preferences for the important special case when the preference ordering over
sure consequence streams is represented by a utilitarian social welfare func-
tion defined on the Banach space `∞ of all bounded utility streams in RN
that is not only strictly increasing and continuous, but is also linear. For this
important special case, Theorem 2 of Chichilnisky (1996) offers a complete
characterization using finitely additive measures that represent linear func-
tionals in the dual of `∞. See Chichilnisky (1996, 1997, 2009), Heal (2000),
and Lauwers (2017) for further discussion, including specific examples that
use sustainable preferences to analyse renewable and exhaustible resources.
Among other work that discusses sustainable preferences, we mention
Figuie`res and Tidball (2012), which builds on work by Chichilnisky, Heal
and Beltratti (1995) that considers “the green golden rule”.
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8 Extinction Discounting and Beyond
8.1 The Idea of Extinction Discounting
The main approach to discounting the welfare of future generations that is
advocated in the Stern Review on the economics of climate change can be
summarized in the following three passages:
. . . while we do allow, for example, for the possibility that, say, a
meteorite might obliterate the world, and for the possibility that
future generations may be richer (or poorer), we treat the welfare
of future generations on a par with our own.” Stern (2006, p. 35)
. . . the only sound ethical basis for placing less value on the util-
ity (as opposed to consumption) of future generations was the
uncertainty over whether or not the world will exist, or whether
those generations will all be present. Stern (2006, p. 51)
Where discount rates are used in modeling the economic benefits
of climate policy, they should use consumption as the numeraire
and adopt a pure-time discount rate close to zero (the small
positive value reflecting the risk of planetary annihilation only).
Stern (2015, p. 174)
The basic idea for the rule that one should discount only to reflect the
probability of extinction can be traced back to an essay by Ramsey (1931,
p. 291), as indicated in the following passage from Arrow (1999b):25
Koopmans, who has in fact given the basic argument for dis-
counting, nevertheless holds “an ethical preference for neutrality
as between the welfare of different generations” (1965, p. 239).
Robert Solow (1974, p. 9) [wrote]: “In solemn conclave assem-
bled, so to speak, we ought to act as if the social rate of time
preference were zero.” When the conclave is not so solemn, dif-
ferent thoughts appear. Ramsey presented a talk to a group of
friends at Cambridge (the Society, frequently referred to as the
Apostles), in which, talking about our observations of the uni-
verse, he said: “My picture of the world is drawn in perspective.
. . . I apply my perspective not merely to space but also to time.
In time the world will cool and everything will die; but that is a
long way off still, and its present value at compound interest is
almost nothing.”
25Arrow adds emphasis to the end of his quotation from Ramsey, which we have removed.
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Fifty years ago Mirrlees (1967, p. 96),26 in setting out what he regarded
as some essential departures from the “famous paper” of Ramsey (1928),
provided what seems to be the first clear statement of what we are going to
call the “extinction” discounting rule:
I admit the possibility of discounting at a rate r, to allow for the
likelihood of extinction.
The first person, however, to write about the general idea of discounting
due to possible non-existence may be Sidgwick (1907, p. 414), who after the
passage on the interests of posterity which we quoted in Section 5.6, goes
on to add:
. . . except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity and
even the existence of human beings to be affected must neces-
sarily be more uncertain.
8.2 Restricting the Domain of Consequence Lotteries
Once we recognize the unavoidable risk of eventual extinction, it is natural
to consider lotteries λ ∈ ∆∗(Y N) over infinite consequence streams. For each
such lottery, the expected value of the unweighted total utilitarian objective
(37) is
W (λ) := Eλ
[∑∞
i=1
u(yi)
]
=
∑∞
i=1
Eλ[u(yi)] (68)
provided that the infinite sum is defined. The idea of extinction discounting
will be to ensure that for each λ in a suitably restricted domain, and for
each sufficient large i ∈ N, the probability that yi = y0 because i exceeds
the total population before extinction should be high enough to ensure that
the infinite series in (68) converges absolutely.
26It should be noted that both KJA and Koopmans are recognized in Mirrlees’ paper as
being “[a]mong many to whom acknowledgement is due for comment and discussion”. It
also seems appropriate to mention that PJH and NHS both owe an enormous debt to Jim
Mirrlees for arousing our interest in optimal growth theory, and for supervising our Ph.D.
theses. Finally, we take the opportunity to correct the impression given in some obituaries
of Arrow that Mirrlees should be added to Harsanyi, Maskin, Myerson and Spence — the
four of KJA’s former Ph.D. students who were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economics during his lifetime. In fact, instead of advising Mirrlees’ Ph.D. thesis, the
University of Cambridge appointed KJA as external examiner. At the “Academic Tribute
to Kenneth Arrow” held at the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research on 9th
October 2017, Mirrlees duly acknowledged receiving KJA’s extensive comments.
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8.3 A Finite Expected Population as a Sufficient Condition
For each λ ∈ ∆∗(Y N), recall the notation λi introduced in (3) of Section
3.5 for the marginal distribution that λ induces on the ith component yi
of the personal consequence stream Y N. Recall too that in Section 3.3 we
defined y0 as the unique personal consequence in Y where the person never
exists. Hence, the probability that individual i ever joins the population of
individuals who eventually exist is λi(Y \{y0}), the probability that yi 6= y0.
Therefore, the expected total number of individuals who do eventually come
into existence is
N(λ) :=
∑
i∈N λi(Y \ {y0}) (69)
This sum, of course, may be infinite. Restricting attention, however, to
lotteries λ ∈ ∆∗(Y N) for which N(λ) is finite has the following important
implication.
Proposition 2. Under the boundedness Assumption 1, for each lottery λ
such that the expected population N(λ) defined by (69) is finite, the infinite
series
∑∞
i=1 Eλu(yi) in (68) is absolutely convergent.
Proof. As stated in (8), Assumption 1 implies that u ≤ u(y) ≤ u¯ for all
y ∈ Y , with u(y0) = 0. Using the definition of marginal probability, it
follows that for all i ∈ N and all λ ∈ Dfep one has
λi(Y \ {y0})u ≤ Eλiu(yi) = Eλu(yi) ≤ λi(Y \ {y0}) u¯ (70)
Define B := max{−u, u¯}. Then for all i ∈ N the double inequality (70)
implies that
|Eλu(yi)| ≤ B λi(Y \ {y0}) (71)
By definition (69), summing (71) over all i ∈ N gives∑
i∈N |Eλu(yi)| ≤ B
∑
i∈N λi(Y \ {y0}) = BN(λ) (72)
Provided that N(λ) < +∞, this confirms absolute convergence in (68).
8.4 Stochastic Processes of Extinction
Our argument for extinction discounting relies on treating extinction as a
stochastic process. So, for each time t ∈ T , given that extinction will not
have occurred already before time t, let ηt denote the conditional probabil-
ity that extinction will occur precisely at time t. This is the hazard rate
associated with the extinction process.
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Of course, this definition implies that 1−ηt is the conditional probability
at time t − 1 of survival for at least one more period up to time t. Then
for each time t ∈ T , the multiplicative property of successive conditional
probabilities of surviving one more period implies that the probability of
survival till at least time t — i.e., the unconditional probability at time
t = 0 that a non-empty generation Gt can come into existence at time t —
is given by
pit :=
∏t
s=1
(1− ηs) (73)
But then the unconditional probability that extinction occurs precisely at
any specific date t ∈ T is
pit−1 − pit = [1− (1− ηt)]
∏t−1
s=1
(1− ηs) = ηt
∏t−1
s=1
(1− ηs) = pit ηt (74)
where pi0 = 1.
The following definition recognizes how the astrophysics of the sun, to-
gether with possible unavoidable asteroid impacts and also cataclysmic su-
pervolcanos, can be assumed to guarantee humanity’s ultimate extinction.
Definition 7. An extinction process is a non-increasing sequence piT =
〈pit〉t∈T of unconditional survival probabilities pit ∈ [0, 1] satisfying pit → 0
as t→∞. Let Π denote the set of all such processes.
By (74), the probability of extinction at or before any given time s ∈ T
is ∑s
t=1
pit ηt =
∑s
t=1
(pit−1 − pit) = pi0 − pis = 1− pis (75)
When applied to (75), Definition 7 implies that the probability of ultimate
extinction is the limit∑∞
t=1
pit ηt = lim
s→∞
∑s
t=1
pit ηt = lim
s→∞(1− pis) = 1 (76)
8.5 Extinction Discounting: Basic Definitions
Consider now the the product space Π× Y N whose members (piT , yN) com-
bine an extinction process with a personal consequence stream. Here each
yN ∈ Y N should be interpreted, not as an actual infinite stream of lifetime
personal consequences, but rather as the unique potential stream that would
come about only in the zero probability event that extinction is deferred in-
definitely.
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For each extinction date or finite horizon t ∈ T and each potential
consequence stream yN ∈ Y N, define the finite horizon consequence stream
yN|t = 〈yi|t〉i∈N ∈ Y N whose respective personal components are given by
yi|t :=
{
yi if i ∈ ∪ts=1Gs(yN)
y0 if i 6∈ ∪ts=1Gs(yN)
(77)
In other words, yN|t is the modification of yN that would result if extinc-
tion were to occur precisely at date t, thus preventing members of later
generations from ever existing.
For each t ∈ T , let δyN|t ∈ ∆(Y N) denote the degenerate lottery that at-
taches probability 1 to the corresponding finite horizon consequence stream
yN|t. With this notation, depending on (piT , yN) ∈ Π × Y N, the particular
consequence lottery in ∆∗(Y N) that eventually results is
λ(piT , yN) =
∑
t∈T pit ηt δyN|t =
∑
t∈T (pit−1 − pit) δyN|t (78)
where pi0 = 1. Because (76) implies that
∑
t∈T pit ηt = 1, this is an infi-
nite probability mixture of the list 〈δyN|t〉t∈T of successive degenerate finite-
horizon lotteries.
Consider any fixed extinction process piT ∈ Π and consequence stream
yN ∈ Y N. For any i ∈ Gt(yN), rather than the certainty of yi, instead each
person i ∈ Gt(yN) actually faces a lottery given by the probability mixture
λi(pi
T , yN) = pit δyi + (1− pit) δy0 (79)
Denote the associated probability of the event yi ∈ Y \ {y0} that any indi-
vidual i ∈ Gt(yN) will finally exist by
σi(pi
T , yN) := pit = λi(pi
T , yN)(Y \ {y0}) (80)
Given (80), the expected population before extinction, which was given
by (69), can also be expressed as
N(λ(piT , yN)) =
∑
i∈N λi(pi
T , yN)(Y \ {y0}) =
∑
i∈N σi(pi
T , yN) (81)
Recalling that the utility u(y0) of non-existence is 0, person i’s expected
utility from the lottery λi(pi
T , yN) in (79) is
Eλi(piT ,yN)u(yi) = pit u(yi) = σi(pi
T , yN)u(yi) (82)
Summing this over all i ∈ N, it follows that the objective (68) takes the form
W (λ(piT , yN)) =
∑
i∈N σi(pi
T , yN)u(yi) (83)
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8.6 Extinction Discounting: Main Theorem
The following lemma relates the equations (81) and (83) to sums over time
that incorporate appropriate extinction discounting.
Lemma 2. Consider any extinction process piT ∈ Π and any personal con-
sequence stream yN ∈ Y N with associated generation structure GT (yN).
1. The expected population before extinction given by (81) satisfies
N(λ(piT , yN)) =
∑
t∈T pit #Gt(y
N) (84)
2. Provided that N(λ(piT , yN)) is finite, expected total utility is given by
(83), which is absolutely convergent, and satisfies
W (λ(piT , yN)) =
∑
t∈T pit
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi) (85)
Proof. By Definition 1 and Lemma 1 in Section 6.2, one has ∪t∈TGt(yN) =
N, where different sets Gt(yN) are pairwise disjoint. Now, all terms of the
series (81) are non-negative. So, whether it converges or diverges to +∞,
one can rearrange these terms to obtain
N(λ(piT , yN)) =
∑
i∈N σi(pi
T , yN) =
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
σi(pi
T , yN) (86)
But for all i ∈ Gt(yN), equations (79) and (80) imply σi(piT , yN) = pit, so∑
t∈T
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
σi(pi
T , yN) =
∑
t∈T pit #Gt(y
N) (87)
Together (86) and (87) confirm (84).
Next, provided that N(λ(piT , yN)) is finite, Proposition 2 implies that the
infinite series
∑
i∈N Eλ(piT ,yN)u(yi) converges absolutely. By (82), so there-
fore does
∑
i∈N σi(pi
T , yN)u(yi). Rearranging the terms of this absolutely
convergent series while using σi(pi
T , yN) = pit for all i ∈ Gt(yN), it follows
that ∑
i∈N σi(pi
T , yN)u(yi) =
∑
t∈T pit
∑
i∈Gt(yN)
u(yi) (88)
This proves that W (λ(piT , yN)), which is given by (83), also satisfies (85).
Lemma 2 motivates the following definition of extinction discounting,
applied to both the population and the total utility of future generations.
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Definition 8. For any extinction process piT ∈ Π and any personal conse-
quence sequence yN ∈ Y N with associated generation structure GT (yN):
1. the extinction discounted total population is given by (84);
2. provided that the extinction discounted total population is finite, ex-
tinction discounted total utility is given by (85).
Finally, Definition 8 allows us to state our main result rather succinctly.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the combination (piT , yN) of an extinction pro-
cess with a potential personal consequence stream together imply a finite
extinction discounted total population given by (84). Then the extinction
discounted total utility given by (85) is well defined as an absolutely conver-
gent infinite series.
Proof. The result is an obvious implication of Lemma 2 and Definition 8.
8.7 Reconciling Extinction Discounting with Sustainability
Superficially, the only difference between the welfare criterion (85) with ex-
tinction discounting and the criterion (47) with intergenerational discount-
ing comes in the replacement of the discount factors βt in the latter by the
survival probabilities pit in the former. This may make extinction discount-
ing seem like a dictatorship of the present, just like discounted total utility.
A crucial difference, however, is that dictatorship of the present does not
seem so unreasonable when future generations may not exist.
Nevertheless, in order to retain sustainable preferences, one can adapt
the criteria defined in (67) to the present setting with extinction discounting.
The obvious result, for the domain of (piT , yN) having the property that the
extinction discounted expected total population given by (84) is finite, is
the strictly convex combination
(1− ω)W (λ(piT , yN)) + ω
[
α lim inf
i→∞
u(yi) + (1− α) lim sup
i→∞
u(yi)
]
(89)
of the extinction discounting criterion (85) with a dictatorship of the future.
Following Theorem 2 of Chichilnisky (1996) and the discussion in Section 7.7,
an alternative is the sustainable von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function
(1− ω)W (λ(piT , yN)) + ωΦ (〈u(yi)〉i∈N) (90)
Here `∞ 3 uN 7→ Φ(uN) ∈ R is a suitable finitely additive measure that
represents a continuous linear function on the space of bounded utility se-
quences in RN.
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It is interesting to consider what happens in case we depart from Def-
inition 7 of Section 8.4, and allow ω to be the positive probability that
extinction never occurs. Then both (89) and (90) represent total expected
utility when pit becomes the conditional probability of survival up to each
time t, given that extinction occurs in finite time, and the term that multi-
plies ω measures social welfare in case extinction never occurs.
9 Conclusions
9.1 Revisiting Intergenerational Equity
We recall what Arrow (1999a, b) called the “strong argument” for discount-
ing the welfare of future generations. This is that, given other standard
assumptions, avoiding discounting would produce some form of logical con-
tradiction. Our main conclusion, however, is that extinction discounting
avoids any such contradiction under the following two assumptions: (i) the
expected total population before extinction is finite; (ii) following Arrow
(1951, 1965, 1971, 1972), the common fundamental utility function of each
potential individual is bounded both above and below.
Our great friend Kenneth Arrow had espoused both strong and weak ar-
guments in favour of discounting the welfare of future generations not only
in writings such as Arrow (1999a, b, 2007), but also in later oral discussions
with PJH and others. Yet his willingness to engage in these discussions
suggests that, in the end, he may have been starting to experience some
doubt about whether these two arguments, which he attributed to Koop-
mans, really had settled the discounting issue. Extinction discounting not
only provides one possible escape from the logical contradiction that arises
from trying to apply intergenerational equity to an infinite set of individuals.
It may also allow an escape from the claim that too little discounting places
too high a burden on current generations.
9.2 Beyond Welfarism
The welfarist approach that is most often used in public economics, including
by KJA himself, is just one way of looking at the ethics of public and private
decision-making. Indeed, several other approaches have commanded the at-
tention of philosophers when they undertake ethical arguments. Among
these others are: (i) contractarianism; (ii) Kantian ethics; (iii) Aristotelian
ethics; (iv) arguments based on rights or liberty. This is not the place for
a detailed discussion, some elements of which are provided in Stern (2014a;
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2015, Chapter 6), along with references to further discussion of these differ-
ent ethical perspectives.
Here we simply note that these four perspectives that go beyond wel-
farism would all seem to exclude discounting the welfare of individuals who
belong to future generations. It follows that all urge strong action on cli-
mate change. Specifically, a contractarian would likely regard a reasonable
or acceptable social contract as excluding decisions such as those resulting
from an unacceptable dictatorship of the present that rides roughshod over
future lives by refusing to manage climate change. A Kantian categorical
imperative is to behave as you would have others behave; that would likely
involve respecting others’ livelihoods, even if they live decades later. Simi-
larly, an Aristotelian notion of virtue would likely not permit causing serious
damage to others’ lives in pursuit of narrow self-interest. Finally, any ap-
proach based on rights would surely include respecting the rights of future
generations.
We conclude that ethical arguments against discrimination by date of
birth also apply in ethical frameworks that transcend utilitarian consequen-
tialism. “Pure-time discounting” is not merely a narrow technical concern
for nerdy economists. Avoiding this kind of discrimination is fundamental
to most ethical doctrines.
9.3 A More Optimistic Scenario?
Much remains to be done in reforming the world’s economic system in order
to avoid the serious risk of catastrophic climate change due to excessive
greenhouse gas emissions. Other serious risks include excessive acidification
by dissolved CO2, not only of oceans, but also of reserves of fresh water.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the sacrifices required of either the
current or future generations may turn out ultimately to be considerably
less than had been feared back in the late 1990s. This was the period when
negotiations were conducted which led to the Kyoto Protocol being approved
by 160 nations in 1997, and becoming part of international law in 2005 after
enough nations had ratified it.27
First, as is becoming widely recognized, the last ten or fifteen years have
seen quite extraordinary technical progress, especially in using wind and
solar power instead of steam to generate electricity. Along with technologies
such as those that allow vehicles to use electric power to varying degrees,
this is part of a general process whereby clean or zero-carbon technologies
27Chichilnisky and Sheeran (2009) offer one account of these negotiations, particularly
their latter stages.
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have become cheaper than high-carbon technologies in many sectors and
geographical areas. In large measure this transformation has come about as
a result of combining changes in social priorities with a process that KJA
did so much to illuminate — namely the dynamics of learning by doing.28
Second, it may be appropriate to draw attention to the much less well
known yet highly promising technologies for carbon dioxide removal by di-
rect air capture that one of us (GC) has been helping to pioneer.29 Moreover,
there is some prospect in the next few years of a complementary technical
change in the construction industry which, for instance, might allow the
carbon-emitting activity of making cement to be replaced with the pro-
duction of alternative stronger and lighter building materials based on some
form of carbon fibre. If the carbon needed for this came from carbon dioxide
directly captured from the air, it may yet prove possible to begin seriously
reversing the build up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Recently, a
carbon X-prize was announced, intended to “challenge the world to reimag-
ine what we can do with CO2 emissions by incentivizing and accelerating the
development of technologies that convert CO2 into valuable products.”30
Until relatively recently, it had seemed that the world would find it dif-
ficult to reduce the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases to safer
levels without significant sacrifices of economic progress. The prospect of
such sacrifices had become of great concern to KJA who, during his last
two decades, addressed this kind of issue in several co-authored publications
such as Arrow et al. (2003, 2004, 2012, 2013, 2014). Yet thanks in large
part to recent technological developments, we are thinking more and more
about policies that can manage change rather than discussing what “sacri-
fices” might be worthwhile. Indeed, there is the real prospect that directly
capturing CO2 from the air could soon replace existing sources of this widely
used industrial gas and earn sufficient profit to make the sacrifice disappear
entirely. In any case, this emphasis on how to manage change becomes even
more urgent once we begin to consider other issues, such as those concerning
human health and the robustness of ecosystems; here too KJA has had so
much to say. His legacy is truly extraordinary.
28The work on the “learning curve” in Arrow (1962) was cited by the Stanford Uni-
versity School of Engineering when it recognized KJA as a “hero of engineering” — see
engineering.stanford.edu/about/heroes/kenneth-arrow. The award occurred in the
year 2014, whose other “heroes” included the two Stanford alumni who founded GoogleTM,
as well as the late Sally Ride, the first female U.S. astronaut.
29GC is the co-inventor and co-patentee of Carbon Negative TechnologyTM, as described
by Eisenberger, Cohen, Chichilnisky et al. (2009), Chichilnisky (2011), Chichilnisky and
Eisenberger (2011), as well as Choi et al. (2011).
30See carbon.xprize.org.
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